BOOK 1

Introduction

p.70

Thucydides posits the theory that political disunity emerges in fertile and prosperous places. This is due to the attendant inequality of such places, and their attractiveness to invaders.

Infertile places demand more hardiness and unity, and thus can offer a kind of stability. Such was the beginning of Athens.

It appears, for example, that the country now called Hellas had no settled population in ancient times; instead there was a series of migrations, as the various tribes, being under the constant pressure of invaders who were stronger than they were, were always prepared to abandon their own territory. There was no commerce, and no safe communication either by land or sea; the use they made of their land was limited to the production of necessities; they had no surplus left over for capital, and no regular system of agriculture, since they lacked the protection of fortifications and at any moment an invader might appear and take their land away from them. Thus, in the belief that the day-to-day necessities of life could be secured just as well in one place as in another, they showed no reluctance in moving from their homes, and therefore built no cities of any size or strength, nor acquired any important resources. Where the soil was most fertile there were the most frequent changes of population, as in what is now called Thessaly, in Boeotia, in most of the Peloponnese (except Arcadia), and in others of the richest parts of Hellas. For in these fertile districts it was easier for individuals to secure greater powers than their neighbours: this led to disunity, which often caused the collapse of these states, which in any case were more likely than others to attract the attention of foreign invaders.

It is interesting to observe that Attica, which, because of the poverty of her soil, was remarkably free from political disunity, has always been inhabited by the same race of people. Indeed, this is an important example of my theory that it was because of migrations that there was uneven development elsewhere; for when people were driven out from other parts of Greece by war or by disturbances, the most powerful of them took refuge in Athens, as being a stable society; then they became citizens, and soon made the city even more populous than it had been before, with the result that later Attica became too small for her inhabitants and colonies were sent out to Ionia.

p.89

Sparta rose to prominence due to its stability and unity, which Thucydides attributes to its constitutional law, which differentiated it from the surrounding tyrannies. This unity furthermore allowed it to extend its power, and intervene in the affairs of other states.

Finally, however, the Spartans put down tyranny in the rest of Greece, most of which had been governed by tyrants for much longer than Athens. From the time when the Dorians first settled in Sparta there had been a particularly long period of political disunity; yet the Spartan constitution goes back to a very early date, and the country has never been ruled by tyrants. For rather more than 400 years, dating from the end of the late war, they have had the same system of government, and this has been not only a source of internal strength, but has enabled them to intervene in the affairs of other states.

p.91

Like many world powers in the present day, Sparta supported loyal oligarchies in its ally states. In contrast, Athens extracted rents from its clients in return for military protection.

The Spartans did not make their allies pay tribute, but saw to it that they were governed by oligarchies who would work in the Spartan interest. Athens, on the other hand, had in the course of time taken over the fleets of her allies (except for those of Chios and Lesbos) and had made them pay contributions of money instead. Thus the forces available to Athens alone for this war were greater than the combined forces had ever been when the alliance was still intact.

p.94

Even in Thucydides’ day, pop literature was a thing. He makes it clear that he is writing for posterity and not for immediate gain, and makes the appropriate sacrifices in terms of entertainment value.

And it may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever.

THE DISPUTE OVER CORCYRA

p.108

The Corcyrean delegation presents the possible benefits of an alliance to Athens. The Corcyrean delegation admits that isolation has proven incompatible with its current interests.

“We used to think that our neutrality was a wise thing, since it prevented us being dragged into danger by other people’s policies; now we see it clearly as a lack of foresight and as a source of weakness.”

…

We recognize that, if we have nothing but our own national resources, it is impossible for us to survive, and we can imagine what lies in store for us if they overpower us. We are therefore forced to ask for assistance, both from you and from everyone else; and it should not be held against us that now we have faced the facts and are reversing our old policy of keeping ourselves to ourselves. There is nothing sinister in our action; we merely recognize that we made a mistake.”

p.109

The delegation appeals to Athens’ interests using some clever arguments. Namely, that Corcyra would make a strong and valuable ally, and that it’s a deal they can’t pass up.

“Is it not, then, an extraordinary stroke of good luck for you (and one which will cause heartburning among your enemies) to have us coming over voluntarily into your camp, giving ourselves up to you without involving you in any dangers or any expense? It is a situation where we, whom you are helping, will be grateful to you, the world in general will admire you for your generosity, and you yourselves will be stronger than you were before. There is scarcely a case in history where all these advantages have been available at the same time, nor has it often happened before that a power looking for an alliance can say to those whose help it asks that it can give as much honour and as much security as it will receive.”

p.111

A quotable line from the Corcyrean delegation.

“When one makes concessions to one’s enemies, one regrets it afterwards, and the fewer concessions one makes the safer one is likely to be.”

p.112

“Our enemies are your enemies. If you do not help us, you are in fact helping your enemies.”

“In fact it is we who shall have far greater reasons to complain of you if you are not willing to help us; you will be rejecting us, who are no enemies of yours, in the hour of our peril, and as for the others, who are enemies of yours and are also the aggressors, you will not only be doing nothing to stop them, but will actually be allowing them to build up their strength from the resources of your own empire. Is this right? Surely you ought either to stop them from engaging troops from your own subjects, or else to give us, too, whatever assistance you think proper. Best of all would be for you to receive us in open alliance and help us in that way.”

p.113

The delegation adds that Corcyra’s fleet would make a useful addition to the fleet of Athens.

“Your aim, no doubt, should be, if it were possible, to prevent anyone else having a navy at all: the next best thing is to have on your side the strongest navy that there is.”

THE DEBATE AT SPARTA AND DECLARATION OF WAR

p.149

The Corinthians criticize Sparta, while at the same time trying to convince them to fight Athens. The criticism is aimed at Sparta’s tendency to consider situations carefully and to act slowly, while Athens acts in a feisty and aggressive manner to seize the initiative.

“You Spartans are the only people in Hellas who wait calmly on events, relying for your defence not on action but on making people think that you will act. You alone do nothing in the early stages to prevent an enemy’s expansion; you wait until your enemy has doubled his strength. Certainly you used to have the reputation of being safe and sure enough: now one wonders whether this reputation was deserved. The Persians, as we know ourselves, came from the ends of the earth and got as far as the Peloponnese before you were able to put a proper force into the field to meet them. The Athenians, unlike the Persians, live close to you, yet still you do not appear to notice them; instead of going out to meet them, you prefer to stand still and wait till you are attacked, thus hazarding everything by fighting with opponents who have grown far stronger than they were originally.”

p.151

The main substance of the Corinthian criticism is as follows:

“Then also we think we have as much right as anyone else to point out faults in our neighbours, especially when we consider the enormous difference between you and the Athenians. To our minds, you are quite unaware of this difference; you have never yet tried to imagine what sort of people these Athenians are against whom you will have to fight – how much, indeed how completely different from you. An Athenian is always an innovator, quick to form a resolution and quick at carrying it out. You, on the other hand, are good at keeping things as they are; you never originate an idea, and your action tends to stop short of its aim. Then again, Athenian daring will outrun its own resources; they will take risks against their better judgement, and still, in the midst of danger, remain confident. But your nature is always to do less than you could have done, to mistrust your own judgement, however sound it may be, and to assume that dangers will last for ever. Think of this, too: while you are hanging back, they never hesitate; while you stay at home, they are always abroad; for they think that the farther they go the more they will get, while you think that any movement may endanger what you have already. If they win a victory, they follow it up at once, and if they suffer a defeat, they scarcely fall back at all. As for their bodies, they regard them as expendable for their city’s sake, as though they were not their own; but each man cultivates his own intelligence, again with a view to doing something notable for his city. If they aim at something and do not get it, they think that they have been deprived of what belonged to them already; whereas, if their enterprise is successful, they regard that success as nothing compared to what they will do next. Suppose they fail in some undertaking; they make good the loss immediately by setting their hopes in some other direction. Of them alone it may be said that they possess a thing almost as soon as they have begun to desire it, so quickly with them does action follow upon decision. And so they go on working away in hardship and danger all the days of their lives, seldom enjoying their possessions because they are always adding to them. Their view of a holiday is to do what needs doing; they prefer hardship and activity to peace and quiet. In a word, they are by nature incapable of either living a quiet life themselves or of allowing anyone else to do so.”

“That is the character of the city which is opposed to you. Yet you still hang back; you will not see that the likeliest way of securing peace is this: only to use one’s power in the cause of justice, but to make it perfectly plain that one is resolved not to tolerate aggression. On the contrary, your idea of proper behaviour is, firsdy, to avoid harming others, and then to avoid being harmed yourselves, even if it is a matter of defending your own interests. Even if you had on your frontiers a power holding the same principles as you do, it is hard to see how such a policy could have been a success. But at the present time, as we have just pointed out to you, your whole way of life is out of date when compared with theirs. And it is just as true in politics as it is in any art or craft: new methods must drive out old ones. When a city can live in peace and quiet, no doubt the old-established ways are best: but when one is constantly being faced by new problems, one has also to be capable of approaching them in an original way. Thus Athens, because of the very variety of her experience, is a far more modern state than you are.”

p.161

Some visiting Athenians offer a defense of Athens, saying that they gained an empire by accident, that they deserve their power, and they generally act in a just manner.

“So it is with us. We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so – security, honour, and self-interest. And we were not the first to act in this way. Far from it. It has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; and besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power. Up till the present moment you, too, used to think that we were; but now, after calculating your own interest, you are beginning to talk in terms of right and wrong. Considerations of this kind have never yet turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength. Those who really deserve praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nevertheless pay more attention to justice than they are compelled to do by their situation. “

p.167

The Spartan King Archidamus, speaking in a closed session, considers the situation, and decides to buy some time to build up his forces.

“Not that I am suggesting that we should calmly allow them to injure our allies and should turn a blind eye to their machinations. What I do suggest is that we should not take up arms at the present moment; instead we should send to them and put our grievances before them; we should not threaten war too openly, though at the same time we should make it clear that we are not going to let them have their own way. In the meantime we should be making our own preparations by winning over new allies both among Hellenes and among foreigners – from any quarter, in fact, where we can increase our naval and financial resources. No one can blame us for securing our own safety by taking foreigners as well as Greeks into our alliance when we are, as is the fact, having our position undermined by the Athenians. At the same time we must put our own affairs in order. If they pay attention to our diplomatic protests, so much the better. If they do not, then, after two or three years have passed, we shall be in a much sounder position and can attack them, if we decide to do so.”

…

“Let no one call it cowardice if we, in all our numbers, hesitate before attacking a single city. They have just as many allies as we have, and their allies pay tribute. And war is not so much a matter of armaments as of the money which makes armaments effective: particularly is this true in a war fought between a land power and a sea power. So let us first of all see to our finances and, until we have done so, avoid being swept away by speeches from our allies. It is we who shall bear most of the responsibility for what happens later, whether it is good or bad; we should therefore be allowed the time to look into some of these possibilities at our leisure.”

p.170

The Spartan retort to the Corinthian criticism: the Spartan way is one of discipline, consistency, and pragmatism.

“As for being slow and cautious – which is the usual criticism made against us – there is nothing to be ashamed of in that. If you take something on before you are ready for it, hurry at the beginning will mean delay at the end. Besides, the city in which we live has always been free and always famous. “Slow” and “cautious” can equally well be “wise” and “sensible”. Certainly it is because we possess these qualities that we are the only people who do not become arrogant when we are successful, and who in times of stress are less likely to give in than others. We are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing ourselves praised when people are urging us towards dangers that seem to us unnecessary; and we are no more likely to give in shamefacedly to other people’s views when they try to spur us on by their accusations. Because of our well-ordered life we are both brave in war and wise in council. Brave, because self-control is based upon a sense of honour, and honour is based on courage. And we are wise because we are not so highly educated as to look down upon our laws and customs, and are too rigorously trained in self-control to be able to disobey them. We are trained to avoid being too clever in matters that are of no use – such as being able to produce an excellent theoretical criticism of one’s enemies’ dispositions, and then failing in practice to do quite so well against them. Instead we are taught that there is not a great deal of difference between the way we think and the way others think, and that it is impossible to calculate accurately events that are determined by chance. The practical measures that we take are always based on the assumption that our enemies are not unintelligent. And it is right and proper for us to put our hopes in the reliability of our own precautions rather than in the possibility of our opponent making mistakes. There is no need to suppose that human beings differ very much one from another: but it is true that the ones who come out on top are the ones who have been trained in the hardest school.”

BOOK TWO

Outbreak of War

PERICLES’ FUNERAL ORATION

p.293

‘Let me say that our system of government does not copy the institutions of our neighbours. It is more the case of our being a model to others, than of our imitating anyone else. Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty. And, just as our political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life in our relations with each other. We do not get into a state with our next-door neighbour if he enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we give him the kind of black looks which, though they do no real harm, still do hurt people’s feelings. We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect.’

p.294

Pericles extols the democratic virtues of Athens, and holds it up as an example for all of Hellas. A differing opinion from an external observer would be that Athens has been aggressive and restless in building an empire and subjugating its neighbors, and Pericles’ words are those of elitist condescension spoken from the zenith of power. Athens is a multinational power, and a nexus of trade with a strong navy. Its citizens enjoy an exceptional standard of living amongst ancient peoples.

‘And here is another point. When our work is over, we are in a position to enjoy all kinds of recreation for our spirits. There are various kinds of contests and sacrifices regularly throughout the year; in our own homes we find a beauty and a good taste which delight us every day and which drive away our cares. Then the greatness of our city brings it about that all the good things from all over the world flow in to us, so that to us it seems just as natural to enjoy foreign goods as our own local products.

‘Then there is a great difference between us and our opponents, in our attitude towards military security. Here are some examples: Our city is open to the world, and we have no periodical deportations in order to prevent people observing or finding out secrets which might be of military advantage to the enemy. This is because we rely, not on secret weapons, but on our own real courage and loyalty. There is a difference, too, in our educational systems. The Spartans, from their earliest boyhood, are submitted to the most laborious training in courage; we pass our lives without all these restrictions, and yet are just as ready to face the same dangers as they are. Here is a proof of this: When the Spartans invade our land, they do not come by themselves, but bring all their allies with them; whereas we, when we launch an attack abroad, do the job by ourselves, and, though fighting on foreign soil, do not often fail to defeat opponents who are fighting for their own hearths and homes. As a matter of fact none of our enemies has ever yet been confronted with our total strength, because we have to divide our attention between our navy and the many missions on which our troops are sent on land. Yet, if our enemies engage a detachment of our forces and defeat it, they give themselves credit for having thrown back our entire army; or, if they lose, they claim that they were beaten by us in full strength. There are certain advantages, I think, in our way of meeting danger voluntarily, with an easy mind, instead of with a laborious training, with natural rather than with state-induced courage. We do not have to spend our time practising to meet sufferings which are still in the future; and when they are actually upon us we show ourselves just as brave as these others who are always in strict training. This is one point in which, I think, our city deserves to be admired. There are also others:

`Our love of what is beautiful does not lead to extravagance; our love of the things of the mind does not make us soft. We regard wealth as something to be properly used, rather than as something to boast about. As for poverty, no one need be ashamed to admit it: the real shame is in not taking practical measures to escape from it. Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occupied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics – this is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all. We Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussions: for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated. And this is another point where we differ from other people. We are capable at the same time of taking risks and of estimating them beforehand. Others are brave out of ignorance; and, when they stop to think, they begin to fear. But the man who can most truly be accounted brave is he who best knows the meaning of what is sweet in life and of what is terrible, and then goes out undeterred to meet what is to come.

‘Again, in questions of general good feeling there is a great contrast between us and most other people. We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good from them. This makes our friendship all the more reliable, since we want to keep alive the gratitude of those who are in our debt by showing continued good-will to them: whereas the feelings of one who owes us something lack the same enthusiasm, since he knows that, when he repays our kindness, it will be more like paying back a debt than giving something spontaneously. We are unique in this. When we do kindnesses to others, we do not do them out of any calculations of profit or loss: we do them without afterthought, relying on our free liberality. Taking everything together then, I declare that our city is an education to Greece, and I declare that in my opinion each single one of our citizens, in all the manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person, and do this, moreover, with exceptional grace and exceptional versatility. And to show that this is no empty boasting for the present occasion, but real tangible fact, you have only to consider the power which our city possesses and which has been won by those very qualities which I have mentioned. Athens, alone of the states we know, comes to her testing time in a greatness that surpasses what was imagined of her. In her case, and in her case alone, no invading enemy is ashamed at being defeated, and no subject can complain of being governed by people unfit for their responsibilities. Mighty indeed are the marks and monuments of our empire which we have left. Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now. We do not need the praises of a Homer, or of anyone else whose words may delight us for the moment, but whose estimation of facts will fall short of what is really true. For our adventurous spirit has forced an entry into every sea and into every land; and everywhere we have left behind us everlasting memorials of good done to our friends or suffering inflicted on our enemies.`

THE PLAGUE

p.314

The arrival of the plague in Athens after the first year of the war caused a breakdown in social order. Hedonism and lawlessness ensue.

In other respects also Athens owed to the plague the beginnings of a state of unprecedented lawlessness. Seeing how quick and abrupt were the changes of fortune which came to the rich who suddenly died and to those who had previously been penniless but now inherited their wealth, people now began openly to venture on acts of self-indulgence which before then they used to keep dark. Thus they resolved to spend their money quickly and to spend it on pleasure, since money and life alike seemed equally ephemeral. As for what is called honour, no one showed himself willing to abide by its laws, so doubtful was it whether one would survive to enjoy the name for it. It was generally agreed that what was both honourable and valuable was the pleasure of the moment and everything that might conceivably contribute to that pleasure. No fear of god or law of man had a restraining influence. As for the gods, it seemed to be the same thing whether one worshipped them or not, when one saw the good and the bad dying indiscriminately. As for offences against human law, no one expected to live long enough to be brought to trial and punished: instead everyone felt that already a far heavier sentence had been passed on him and was hanging over him, and that before the time for its execution arrived it was only natural to get some pleasure out of life.

THE POLICY OF PERICLES

p.320

After a second invasion of Attica by the Peloponessians, the Athenians are growing angry at Pericles. He gives a speech in his defense.

‘I expected this outbreak of anger on your part against me, since I understand the reasons for it; and I have called an assembly with this object in view, to remind you of your previous resolutions and to put forward my own case against you, if we find that there is anything unreasonable in your anger against me and in your giving way to your misfortunes. My own opinion is that when the whole state “is on the right course it is a better thing for each separate individual than when private interests are satisfied but the state as a whole is going downhill.

…

‘If one has a free choice and can live undisturbed, it is sheer folly to go to war. But suppose the choice was forced upon one – submission and immediate slavery or danger with the hope of survival: then I prefer the man who stands up to danger rather than the one who runs away from it. As for me, I am the same as I was, and do not alter; it is you who have changed. What has happened is this: you took my advice when you were still untouched by misfortune, and repented of your action when things went badly with you; it is because your own resolution is weak that my policy appears to you to be mistaken.

..

Not courage alone, therefore, but an actual sense of your superiority should animate you as you go forward against the enemy. Confidence, out of a mixture of ignorance and good luck, can be felt even by cowards; but this sense of superiority comes only to those who, like us, have real reasons for knowing that they are better placed than their opponents. And when the chances on both sides are equal, it is intelligence that confirms courage – the intelligence that makes one able to look down on one’s opponent, and which proceeds not by hoping for the best (a method only valuable in desperate situations), but by estimating what the facts are, and thus obtaining a clearer vision of what to expect.”

p.326

The speech seems to contradict his earlier funeral oration. He now acknowledges that Athens, through its expansion, has become a tyranny.

‘Then it is right and proper for you to support the imperial dignity of Athens. This is something in which you all take pride, and you cannot continue to enjoy the privileges unless you also shoulder the burdens of empire. And do not imagine that what we are fighting for is simply the question of freedom or slavery: there is also involved the loss of our empire and the dangers arising from the hatred which we have incurred in administering it. Nor is it any longer possible for you to give up this empire, though there may be some people who in a mood of sudden panic and in a spirit of political apathy actually think that this would be a fine and noble thing to do. Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go. And the kind of people who talk of doing so and persuade others to adopt their point of view would very soon bring a state to ruin, and would still do so even if they lived by themselves in isolation. For those who are politically apathetic can only survive if they are supported by people who are capable of taking action. They are quite valueless in a city which controls an empire, though they would be safe slaves in a city that was controlled by others.”

p.331

After the death of Pericles, lesser men, who were focused on their own private interests, caused the decay of the Athenian state.

But his successors did the exact opposite, and in other matters which apparently had no connection with the war private ambition and private profit led to policies which were bad both for the Athenians themselves and for their allies. Such policies, when successful, only brought credit and advantage to individuals, and when they failed, the whole war potential of the state was impaired. The reason for this was that Pericles, because of his position, his intelligence, and his known integrity, could respect the liberty of the people and at the same time hold them in check. It was he who led them, rather than they who led him, and, since he never sought power from any wrong motive, he was under no necessity of flattering them: in fact he was so highly respected that he was able to speak angrily to them and to contradict them. Certainly when he saw that they were going too far in a mood of over-confidence, he would bring back to them a sense of their dangers; and when they were discouraged for no good reason he would restore their confidence. So, in what was nominally a democracy, power was really in the hands of the first citizen. But his successors, who were more on a level with each other and each of whom aimed at occupying the first place, adopted methods of demagogy which resulted in their losing control over the actual conduct of affairs. Such a policy, in a great city with an empire to govern, naturally led to a number of mistakes, amongst which was the Sicilian expedition, though in this case the mistake was not so much an error of judgement with regard to the opposition to be expected as a failure on the part of those who were at home to give proper support to their forces overseas.28 Because they were so busy with their own personal intrigues for securing the leadership of the people, they allowed this expedition to lose its impetus, and by quarrelling among themselves began to bring confusion into the policy of the state.

THE FALL OF POTIDAEA

THE SIEGE OF PLATAEA

VICTORIES OF PHORMIO

p.365

In preparing for a naval battle against the Athenian admiral Phormio, the Peloponnesian commanders speak to their men to increase their morale, having been previously defeated in a naval battle against the Athenians due to lack of experience.

‘Instead we should remember that accidents may happen to all men, but real courage never alters, and those who have it never use inexperience as an excuse for being anything else but courageous. So far as you are concerned you may lack the enemy’s experience, but that is more than made up for by your superior daring. This skill of theirs, which is the thing which you fear most, has to be combined with courage. Then, in the hour of danger, they will remember how to do what they have learnt to do. But if a stout heart is lacking, all the skill in the world will not avail in the face of peril. Fear drives out all memory of previous instruction, and without the will to resist, skill is useless. So, when you think of their greater experience you must also think of your own greater courage, and when you feel frightened because of the defeat you have suffered, you must remember that at that time you were caught off your guard and unprepared.’

REVOLT OF MYTILENE

p.400

The city of Mytilene, on the island of Lesbos, had maintained a tenuous semblance of independence under Athens in the period before the war. In the third year of the war, circumstances forced them to revolt against Athens before adequate preparations had been made. In this speech, a Mytlinenean ambassador appeals to Sparta for help in repelling an Athenian invasion. The appeal describes the devious way in which Athens gradually enslaved its allies.

‘ So long as the Athenians in their leadership respected our independence, we followed them with enthusiasm. But when we saw that they were becoming less and less antagonistic to Persia and more and more interested in enslaving their own allies, then we became frightened. Because of the multiple voting system, the allies were incapable of uniting in self-defence, and so they all became enslaved except for us and for Chios. We, supposed to be independent and nominally free, furnished our own contingents in the allied forces. But with the examples before us of what had already happened, we no longer felt any confidence in Athenian leadership. It seemed very unlikely that, after having brought under their control the states who were fellow members with us, they would refrain from acting towards us, too, in the same way, if ever they felt strong enough to do so.

‘If we had all still been independent, we could have had more confidence in their not altering the state of affairs. But with most of their allies subjected to them and us being treated as equals, it was natural for them to object to a situation where the majority had already given in and we alone stood out as independent – all the more so since they were becoming stronger and stronger and we were losing whatever support we had before. And in an alliance the only safe guarantee is an equality of mutual fear; for then the party that wants to break faith is deterred by the thought that the odds will not be on his side.

‘In fact the only reason why we were left with our independence was because the Athenians, in building up their empire, thought that they could seize power more easily by having some specious arguments to put forward and by using the methods of policy rather than of brute force. We were useful to them because they could point to us and say that we, who had votes like themselves, could not possibly have joined them unwillingly in their various expeditions and could seize power more easily by having some specious arguments to put forward and by using the methods of policy rather than of brute force. We were useful to them because they could point to us and say that we, who had votes like themselves, could not possibly have joined them unwillingly in their various expeditions and could only be doing so because the people against whom we were being led were in the wrong. By these methods they first led the stronger states against the weaker ones, leaving the strongest to the last in the certainty of finding them, once all the rest had been absorbed, much less formidable to deal with. If, on the other hand, they had started with us, when all the other states still had their strength and had also a centre round which they could stand, they would not have subjugated them so easily. Then also they felt some alarm about our navy, in case it might come together as one force and join you or some other power, and so become a danger to Athens. Another factor in securing our independence was the trouble we took to be on good terms with the Athenian assembly and with their various leading statesmen. Yet, with the examples we had of how they had behaved to others, we never expected to be able to maintain ourselves for long, if this war had not broken out.

‘How could we feel any genuine friendship or any confidence in our liberty when we were in a situation like this? The terms on which we accepted each other ran counter to the real feelings of both sides. In wartime they did their best to be on good terms with us because they were frightened of us; we, for the same reason, tried to keep on good terms with them in peace-time. In most cases goodwill is the basis of loyalty, but in our case fear was the bond, and it was more through terror than through friendship that we were held together in alliance. And the alliance was certain to be broken at any moment by the first side that felt confident that this would be a safe move to make. So it is wrong to condemn us for breaking away first simply because Athens had not yet taken action against us, or to say that we ought to have waited until we were quite sure what action they would take. For if we had the same ability as they have for planning action and then putting it off, we should be their equals, and there would be no need for us to be their subjects. As it is, they are always in the position where they can take the initiative in aggression; we should be allowed the initiative in self-defence.

‘These, Spartans and allies, are the reasons and the causes for our revolt. They are clear enough to convince our hearers that we have not acted improperly, and they constitute sufficient grounds for us to feel alarmed and to look round for what security we can find.

…

‘As for the Hellenes, we shall no longer join the Athenians in acts of aggression on them, but shall help in the work of liberation; and as for the Athenians, we shall take the initiative in breaking away from them, instead of waiting to be destroyed by them later.

‘However our revolt has taken place earlier than we intended and without adequate preparations.

p.406

An element of their appeal mirrors that of the Corcyrean appeal to Athens;  it cites the advantages to Sparta of the proposed alliance.

‘And do not think that you are endangering your own persons for the sake of a country that has nothing to do with you. You may think that Lesbos is a long way away, but you will find that the good it can do you is very close at hand. It is not in Attica, as some people think, that the war will be won or lost, but in the countries from which Attica draws her strength. Her financial power comes from the tribute paid by her allies, and this will be greater still if we are conquered. For there will be no other revolts, our resources will be added to theirs, and we shall be treated more harshly than those who were enslaved before us. But if you give us your wholehearted support you will gain for yourselves a state which has a large navy (which is the thing you need most); you will be in a much better position for breaking the power of Athens by detaching her allies from her, since the others will be greatly encouraged to come over to you; and you will clear yourselves of the charge that has been made against you of not giving help to those who revolt. Once you come forward in the role of liberators, you will find that your strength in the war is enormously increased.”

p.430

After suppressing the Mytilenian revolt, the Athenians bring back the alleged chief conspirators. An initial decision is made to visit harsh reprisals against the Mytilenian population, including the killing of all adult males and enslavement of the women and children. The Athenians then have a change of heart, and debate the matter. Cleon, who is “remarkable among the Athenians for the violence of his character”, argues for the initial resolution.

His speech has many characteristics of what, to modern readers, would be appear to be conservative or political realist ideology, namely: a distrust of elites and intellectuals, a belief in the fundamental treacherousness of people, and the need for strong, and decisive action in dealing with enemies and competitors, as strength and resolve command more respect than weakness and timidity. He furthermore values stability and persistence over mercurial changes of policy.

“Personally I have had occasion often enough already to observe that a democracy is incapable of governing others, and I am all the more convinced of this when I see how you are now changing your minds about the Mytilenians. Because fear and conspiracy play no part in your daily relations with each other, you imagine that the same thing is true of your allies, and you fail to see that when you allow them to persuade you to make a mistaken decision and when you give way to your own feelings of compassion you are being guilty of a kind of weakness which is dangerous to you and which will not make them love you any more. What you do not realize is that your empire is a tyranny exercised over subjects who do not like it and who are always plotting against you; you will not make them obey you by injuring your own interests in order to do them a favour; your leadership depends on superior strength and not on any goodwill of theirs. And this is the very worst thing – to pass measures and then not to abide by them. We should realize that a city is better off with bad laws, so long as they remain fixed, than with good laws that are constantly being altered, that lack of learning combined with sound common sense is more helpful than the kind of cleverness that gets out of hand, and that as a general rule states are better governed by the man in the street than by intellectuals. These are the sort of people who want to appear wiser than the laws, who want to get their own way in every general discussion, because they feel that they cannot show off their intelligence in matters of greater importance, and who, as a result, very often bring ruin on their country. But the other kind – the people who are not so confident in their own intelligence – are prepared to admit that the laws are wiser than they are and that they lack the ability to pull to pieces a speech made by a good speaker; they are unbiased judges, and not people taking part in some kind of a competition; so things usually go well when they are in control. We statesmen, too, should try to be like them, instead of being carried away by mere cleverness and a desire to show off our intelligence and so giving you, the people, advice which we do not really believe in ourselves.”

p.433

Cleon criticizes the excessive showmanship, lack of subsequent action, and intellectual narcissism in Athenian speech-giving.

“You have become regular speech-goers, and as for action, you merely listen to accounts of it; if something is to be done in the future you estimate the possibilities by hearing a good speech on the subject, and as for the past you rely not so much on the facts which you have seen with your own eyes as on what you have heard about them in some clever piece of verbal criticism. Any novelty in an argument deceives you at once, but when the argument is tried and proved you become unwilling to follow it; you look with suspicion on what is normal and are the slaves of every paradox that comes your way. The chief wish of each one of you is to be able to make a speech himself, and, if you cannot do that, the next best thing is to compete with those who can make this sort of speech by not looking as though you were at all out of your depth while you listen to the views put forward, by applauding a good point even before it is made, and by being as quick at seeing how an argument is going to be developed as you are slow at understanding what in the end it will lead to. What you are looking for all the time is something that is, I should say, outside the range of ordinary experience, and yet you cannot even think straight about the facts of life that are before you. You are simply victims of your own pleasure in listening, and are more like an audience sitting at the feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament discussing matters of state.”

p.435

For Cleon, it is Mytilenian arrogance, and Athenian good treatment towards them, that caused the revolt.

“The fact is that when great prosperity comes suddenly and unexpectedly to a state, it usually breeds arrogance; in most cases it is safer for people to enjoy an average amount of success rather than something which is out of all proportion; and it is easier, I should say, to ward off hardship than to maintain happiness. What we should have done long ago with the Mytilenians was to treat them in exactly the same way as all the rest; then they would never have grown so arrogant; for it is a general rule of human nature that people despise those who treat them well and look up to those who make no concessions.”

p.436

Cleon argues that the Mytilenians must be made an example of in order to keep the peace amongst it allies, and prevent Athenian troubles from multiplying.

“Now think of your allies. If you are going to give the same punishment to those who are forced to revolt by your enemies and those who do so of their own accord, can you not see that they will all revolt upon the slightest pretext, when success means freedom and failure brings no very dreadful consequences? Meanwhile we shall have to spend our money and risk our lives against state after state; if our efforts are successful, we shall recover a city that is in ruins, and so lose the future revenue from it, on which our strength is based; and if we fail to subdue it, we shall have more enemies to deal with in addition to those we have already, and we shall spend the time which ought to be used in resisting our present foes in making war on our own allies.

p.438

Cleon, echoing Pericles, says that the power Athens currently holds must be maintained, and no moral sympathy must be felt for the revolt. To give up power, and not act in one’s self-interest, would be to invite countless dangers.

“Let me sum the whole thing up. I say that, if you follow my advice, you will be doing the right thing as far as Mytilene is concerned and at the same time will be acting in your own interests; if you decide differently, you will not win them over, but you will be passing judgement on yourselves. For if they were justified in revolting, you must be wrong in holding power. If, however, whatever the rights or wrongs of it may be, you propose to hold power all the same, then your interest demands that these too, rightly or wrongly, must be punished. The only alternative is to surrender your empire, so that you can afford to go in for philanthropy. Make up your minds, therefore, to pay them back in their own coin, and do not make it look as though you who escaped their machinations are less quick to react than they who started them. Remember how they would have been likely to have treated you, if they had won, especially as they were the aggressors. Those who do wrong to a neighbour when there is no reason to do so are the ones who persevere to the point of destroying him, since they see the danger involved in allowing their enemy to survive. For he who has suffered for no good reason is a more dangerous enemy, if he escapes, than the one who has both done and suffered injury.”

p.455

After a long and bitter siege, the Plataeans eventually capitulate to the Spartans. The Spartans judge them by posing to them a leading, and disadvantageously-framed, question.

The Plataeans, seeing no easy way out from self-incrimination, use a brilliant device to plead their case: they explicitly state the unfairness of the question and the untenability of their position, and boldly speak their minds, irrespective of the consequences.

‘Spartans, when we surrendered our city to you, we trusted you and we did not expect to face a trial of this sort, but one more in accordance with usual practice. Nor did we expect to be tried, as we are being tried, by other people. We thought that you your selves would be our judges and that from you we should be most likely to get fair treatment. As it is, we fear that on both these points we have been deceived. We have reason to suspect that the issue at stake is nothing less than life or death and that you yourselves are not going to act impartially. Our evidence is in the fact that no accusation has been brought forward for us to answer (indeed we had to ask permission to speak at all), and that your short question is so framed that if we answer it truly, we are condemned, and if falsely, detected in our falsehood. Whichever way we look, we are at a loss, and so we are forced to do what seems also to be the safest thing – that is, to speak our minds at all costs. For, situated as we are words left unspoken might occur to us afterwards and upbraid us with the thought that, if spoken, they might have saved us. Then, too, it is difficult for us to find the power to persuade you. If we were unknown to each other, we could do ourselves good by bringing forward evidence which was new to you; but as it is, we can only tell you things you know already, and what we fear is not so much that you have already decided that our merits will not bear comparison with yours and are making that the basis of your accusation, as that, in order to gratify another state, you are giving us the kind of trial in which the verdict has already been decided in advance. Yet all the same we shall say what we have to say in justification of ourselves, both as regards our quarrel with Thebes and as regards you and the rest of the Hellenes. We shall remind you of our past record and shall try to make you understand our point of view.”

‘In reply to that short question of yours – whether we have done anything to help Sparta and her allies in this war – are you asking it on the assumption that we are your enemies or that we are your friends? If enemies, then we say that you cannot complain of being injured by us, simply because you have not received help from us; but if you regarded us as your friends, then it is you who have done the wrong by marching against us.”

CIVIL WAR IN CORCYRA

p.489

Disputes in Corcyra between an oligarchic faction, aligned with Sparta, and a “democratic” faction, aligned with Athens, spiral into civil war when the Athenian fleet arrives in Corcyra. The civil strife between these factions is replicated in many major cities across the Hellenic world.

The latent tension beneath the peaceful civil society that existed beforehand is brought into stark relief through its most violent expression. The strife is characterized by extremist violence, with no room for reasoned debate or civil discourse. A cult-like party loyalty, and visceral hatred of political enemies, becomes the primary feature of relations between individuals. The propagandistic manipulation of language is implemented to define new systems of power. Using atrocity and betrayal, political actors endlessly manipulate the situation to seize power for themselves. Even those who seek to escape the fray, or remain unaligned themselves, become targets. Notions of justice are discarded.

The strife becomes a cynical means of obtaining power.

Notable are the dulling effects of the war, and how the war prioritized harsh and vigorous action over intelligence and consideration:

“But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily satisfying their daily wants, it brings most people’s minds down to the level of their actual circumstances.”

“As a rule those who were least remarkable for intelligence showed the greater powers of survival. Such people recognized their own deficiencies and the superior intelligence of their opponents; fearing that they might lose a debate or find themselves out-manoeuvred in intrigue by their quick-witted enemies, they boldly launched straight into action; while their opponents, overconfident in the belief that they would see what was happening in advance, and not thinking it necessary to seize by force what they could secure by policy, were the more easily destroyed because they were off their guard.”

Their victims were accused of conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but in fact men were often killed on grounds of personal hatred or else by their debtors because of the money that they owed. There was death in every shape and form. And, as usually happens in such situations, people went to every extreme and beyond it. There were fathers who killed their sons; men were dragged from the temples or butchered on the very altars; some were actually walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there.

So savage was the progress of this revolution, and it seemed all the more so because it was one of the first which had broken out. Later, of course, practically the whole of the Hellenic world was convulsed, with rival parties in every state – democratic leaders trying to bring in the Athenians, and oligarchs trying to bring in the Spartans. In peacetime there would have been no excuse and no desire for calling them in, but in time of war, when each party could always count upon an alliance which would do harm to its opponents and at the same time strengthen its own position, it became a natural thing for anyone who wanted a change of government to call in help from outside. In the various cities these revolutions were the cause of many calamities – as happens and always will happen while human nature is what it is, though there may be different degrees of savagery, and, as different circumstances arise, the general rules will admit of some variety. In times of peace and prosperity cities and individuals alike follow higher standards, because they are not forced into a situation where they have to do what they do not want to do. But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily satisfying their daily wants, it brings most people’s minds down to the level of their actual circumstances.

So revolutions broke out in city after city, and in places where the revolutions occurred late the knowledge of what had happened previously in other places caused still new extravagances of revolutionary zeal, expressed by an elaboration in the methods of seizing power and by unheard-of atrocities in revenge. To fit in with the change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character; ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action.

Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot against an enemy behind his back was perfectly legitimate self-defence. Anyone who held violent opinions could always be trusted, and anyone who objected to them became a suspect. To plot successfully was a sign of intelligence, but it was still cleverer to see that a plot was hatching. If one attempted to provide against having to do either, one was disrupting the unity of the party and acting out of fear of the opposition. In short, it was equally praiseworthy to get one’s blow in first against someone who was going to do wrong, and to denounce someone who had no intention of doing any wrong at all. Family relations were a weaker tie than party membership, since party members were more ready to go to any extreme for any reason whatever. These parties were not formed to enjoy the benefits of the established laws, but to acquire power by overthrowing the existing regime; and the members of these parties felt confidence in each other not because of any fellowship in a religious communion, but because they were partners in crime. If an opponent made a reasonable speech, the party in power, so far from giving it a generous reception, took every precaution to see that it had no practical effect.

Revenge was more important than self-preservation. And if pacts of mutual security were made, they were entered into by the two parties only in order to meet some temporary difficulty, and remained in force only so long as there was no other weapon available. When the chance came, the one who first seized it boldly, catching his enemy off his guard, enjoyed a revenge that was all the sweeter from having been taken, not openly, but because of a breach of faith. It was safer that way, it was considered, and at the same time a victory won by treachery gave one a title for superior intelligence. And indeed most people are more ready to call villainy cleverness than simple-mindedness honesty. They are proud of the first quality and ashamed of the second.

Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils. To this must be added the violent fanaticism which came into play once the struggle had broken out. Leaders of parties in the cities had programmes which appeared admirable – on one side political equality for the masses, on the other the safe and sound government of the aristocracy – but in professing to serve the public interest they were seeking to win the prizes for themselves. In their struggles for ascendancy nothing was barred; terrible indeed were the actions to which they committed themselves, and in taking revenge they went farther still. Here they were deterred neither by the claims of justice nor by the interests of the state; their one standard was the pleasure of their own party at that particular moment, and so, either by means of condemning their enemies on an illegal vote or by violently usurping power over them, they were always ready to satisfy the hatreds of the hour. Thus neither side had any use for conscientious motives; more interest was shown in those who could produce attractive arguments to justify some disgraceful action. As for the citizens who held moderate views, they were destroyed by both the extreme parties, either for not taking part in the struggle or in envy at the possibility that they might survive.

As the result of these revolutions, there was a general deterioration of character throughout the Greek world. The simple way of looking at things, which is so much the mark of a noble nature, was regarded as a ridiculous quality and soon ceased to exist. Society had become divided into two ideologically hostile camps, and each side viewed the other with suspicion. As for ending this state of affairs, no guarantee could be given that would be trusted, no oath sworn that people would fear to break; everyone had come to the conclusion that it was hopeless to expect a permanent settlement and so, instead of being able to feel confident in others, they devoted their energies to providing against being injured themselves. As a rule those who were least remarkable for intelligence showed the greater powers of survival. Such people recognized their own deficiencies and the superior intelligence of their opponnents; fearing that they might lose a debate or find themselves out-manoeuvred in intrigue by their quick-witted enemies, they boldly launched straight into action; while their opponents, overconfident in the belief that they would see what was happening in advance, and not thinking it necessary to seize by force what they could secure by policy, were the more easily destroyed because they were off their guard.

BOOK FOUR

FURTHER ATHENIAN SUCCESSES

p.602

After the victory at Pylos by the Athenians, and subsequent landings by the Athenians on the Peloponnese, Thucydides repeats a theme he had mentioned earlier: the difference between the Spartan and Athenian characters and methods of warfare.

The Athenians are aggressive and fast-moving; the Spartans are deliberative and less adaptive.

The Spartans suffer a series of setbacks that degrade their morale and breed over-cautiousness.

What they feared was that there might be a revolution against the government after the great and unexpected disaster at Sphacteria, with Pylos and Cythera now in enemy hands, and committed as they were on every side to a form of warfare where mobility was what counted and where attacks were difficult to guard against. Thus they raised a force of 400 cavalry and a force of archers – something quite at variance with their normal way of doing things – and in fact they now became more than ever irresolute in their military conduct; they were faced with something outside the scope of their existing organization, namely a war fought on the seas and fought against Athenians – people who thought that every moment when they were not attacking was so much sacrificed from their expectation of achievement. Then, too, they were very greatly disheartened by the many unpredictable blows of fortune which had fallen upon them in such a short time, and they were constantly afraid that some other disaster might overtake them like the one at Sphacteria. For this reason they lacked confidence when they went into battle; they had had no previous experience of misfortune, and so their morale collapsed and they thought that whatever step they took would prove to be a mistake.

PEACE IN SICILY

p.606

Faced with the possibility of being subsumed into the Athenian empire, the city-states of Sicily must put aside adversarial relationships in face of the foreign threat.

Hermocrates of Syracuse gives a clever speech arguing for Sicilian unity. He, like the other speakers in this work, appeals to the self-interest of his audience; he argues that unity is ultimately in the interest of each individual city-state.

“… No one is forced into war by ignorance, nor, if he thinks he will gain from it, is he kept out of it by fear. The fact is that one side thinks that the profits to be won outweigh the risks to be incurred, and the other side is ready to face danger rather than accept an immediate loss. If, however, on these very points both sides happen to be choosing the wrong moment for action, then there is something to be gained from attempts at mediation. And this, if we could only be convinced of it, is just what we need most at the present time.

‘When we went to war in the first place we all, no doubt, had the idea of furthering our own private interests, and we have the same idea now that we are attempting, by a process of claims and counterclaims, to arrange a settlement. And if things do not work out so that everyone goes away with what he considers his due, then no doubt we shall go to war again. Yet, if we are sensible, we should realize that this conference is not simply concerned with the private interests of each state; we have also to consider whether we can still preserve the existence of Sicily as a whole. It is now, as I see it, being threatened by Athens, and we ought to regard the Athenians as much more forcible arguments for peace than any words that can be spoken by me. They are the greatest power in Hellas, and here they are among us with a few ships, watching for us to make mistakes, and, though by nature we must be their enemies, they are, under the cover of a legal alliance, trying to arrange matters to suit themselves. Now if we fight among ourselves and call in the help of the Athenians, who are only too willing to join in whether they are called for or not; if we then proceed to use our own resources in weakening ourselves, thus doing the preliminary work for their future empire, the likely thing to happen is that, when they see us exhausted, they will come here one day with larger forces and will attempt to bring all of us under their control.

‘Yet, if we are sensible, our aim in calling in allies and running additional risks should be to win for ourselves something that does not belong to us rather than to ruin what we have already. We should realize that internal strife is the main reason for the decline of cities, and will be so for Sicily too, if we, the inhabitants, who are all threatened together, still stand apart from each other, city against city. Having grasped this point, we should make friends, man with man and city with city, and should set out on a united effort to save Sicily as a whole. No one should have the idea that, while the Dorians among us are enemies to the Athenians, the Chalcidians are quite safe because of their Ionian blood. Athenian intervention has nothing to do with the races into which we are divided; they are not attacking us because they hate one or the other; what they want is the good things of Sicily which are the common property of us all. They made this quite clear recently by the way in which they received the invitation of the Chalcidians. The Chalcidians had never once sent any help to Athens according to their treaty with her; but Athens went out of her way zealously to provide even more than the treaty bound her to do. Now it is perfectly understandable that the Athenians should have these ambitions and should be making their plans accordingly. I am not blaming those who are resolved to rule, only those who show an even greater readiness to submit. For men in general it is always just as natural to take control when there is no resistance as to stand out against aggression. And we are making a great mistake if, knowing all this, we fail to take our precautions, or if we have come here on the assumption that we have anything more important to do than to join forces in dealing with the danger that threatens us all. We could quickly be rid of it, if we would agree among ourselves, since the Athenians are not attacking us from bases in their own country, but only from bases in the country of those states here who have called them in. So instead of war following upon war, our differences are quietly settled in peace; and as for those who were called in from outside, they came here with what looked like a good excuse for their evil ends, but they will now have a really good reason to go away without having attained them.

‘These, so far as the Athenians are concerned, are the great advantages to be found in adopting a wise policy. But apart from this, since it is admitted by everyone that peace is the greatest of blessings, ought we not therefore to make peace among ourselves? Suppose that one of you enjoys an advantage now or another one labours under some handicap, do you not think that in both cases, for preserving the advantage and for remedying the handicap, peace is better than war? Has not peace its honours and its glories, less attended by danger than those to be won in war? And are there not all those other advantages in peace, to describe which countless words would be required – as would be required also to enumerate the miseries of war?’

‘These are the points to consider; and so, instead of making light of my advice, you should make use of it, each one for his own preservation. And if there is anyone here who is convinced that either by violence or because of the justice of his cause he can attain some object of his own, let him not take too much to heart the disappointment of his ambition. He must realize that many before now have set out to punish aggression, and many others also have been confident that their power would secure them some advantage. Of these, the former, so far from being revenged, have often been destroyed, and with the latter it has often happened that, instead of gaining anything for themselves, they have had to give up what they had already. If an injury has been done, it does not necessarily follow that an attempt to redress it will be successful; nor can strength be relied upon simply because it is confident in itself. That imponderable element of the future is the thing which counts in the long run, and, just as we are most frequently deceived by it, so too it can be of the greatest possible use to us; for, if we all fear it alike, we shall think twice before we attack each other.’

‘We have now two reasons for being afraid: there is this unspecified fear of an inscrutable future and there is the actual presence of the Athenians to terrify us. If therefore every one of us does not get exactly everything that he thought he would get, we should recognize that there are good grounds here to prevent this happening. Let us instead dismiss from our territory the enemy who is threatening us, and for ourselves, if we cannot make a peace that will last for ever, let us at least come to terms for as long a period as possible and put off our private quarrels to another time. In a word, let us realize that by following my advice we shall each keep the freedom of our own cities, and in these cities will be able to act in the true spirit of independent men, returning good for good and evil for evil; whereas if we take the opposite course we shall be under the power of others, and then there will no longer be any question of our being able to do harm to an opponent; the very best that can happen to us is that we shall be forced to become friends with our greatest enemies and enemies to those with whom we should be friends.’

p.615

Thucydides remarks on Athenian hubris.

Such was the effect on the Athenians of their present good fortune that they thought that nothing could go wrong with them; that the possible and the difficult were alike attainable, whether the forces employed were large or wholly inadequate. It was their surprising success in most directions which caused this state of mind and suggested to them that their strength was equal with their hopes.

FIGHTING AT MEGARA

BRASIDAS IN THRACE

p.635

Sparta’s run of bad luck had two important consequences:

a) a persistent fear amongst the Spartans of revolt by the helots, and

b) the decision by the Spartans to deploy their army abroad to bring about revolts in the Athenian periphery. This was implemented as a counter-strategy to the Athenian incursions into the Peloponnese, which were close to Sparta itself.

The fact that at the time Sparta was doing so badly made it easier for them to get this army from the Peloponnese. For now that the Athenians were making their attacks on the Peloponnese, and particularly on the actual territory of Sparta, the Spartans thought that the best way of diverting these attacks would be to give Athens, too, the same kind of trouble by sending an army to her allies, particularly as these allies were prepared to supply the army and were asking for it in order to be able to revolt. The Spartans were also glad to have a good excuse for sending some of their helots out of the country, since in the present state of affairs, with Pylos in enemy hands, they feared a revolution. In fact they were so frightened of their unyielding character and of their numbers that they had had recourse to the following plan. (Spartan policy with regard to the helots had always been based almost entirely on the idea of security.) They made a proclamation to the effect that the helots should choose out of their own number those who claimed to have done the best service to Sparta on the battlefield, implying that they would be given their freedom. This was, however, a test conducted in the belief that the ones who showed most spirit and came forward first to claim their freedom would be the ones most likely to turn against Sparta. So about 2,000 were selected, who put garlands on their heads and went round the temples under the impression that they were being made free men. Soon afterwards, however, the Spartans did away with them, and no one ever knew exactly how each one of them was killed.

ATHENIAN DEFEAT AT DELIUM

p.649

The Athenians had conspired to incite chaos in Boeotia to gain some territory. The plan was fumbled by a lack of synchronization and by a leak of information to the Spartans.

A battle occurs at Delium, and a Theban commander, Pagondas, gives an insightful speech to his troops, elucidating the different considerations for those who engage in wars of defense versus those of aggression.

“When one is being attacked and has to think about the safety of one’s own country, one cannot go in for calculations about what is prudent. That is more the thing to be done by those whose own country is secure and who, in the desire to make further conquests, are deliberately attacking someone else. And it is your tradition to fight a foreign army of invasion, whether it is in your country or anywhere near it. Much more should we do so in the case of Athenians, who also share the same frontier with us. In all relations with one’s neighbours freedom is the result of being able to hold one’s own, and as for these neighbours, who, not content with those close to them, are trying to spread their domination far and wide, with them we must simply fight it out to the last.

…

“Then, too, when people attack their neighbours in a spirit of great confidence in their own strength – as is the case with the Athenians now – they usually march all the more boldly against an enemy who makes no move against them and only defends himself on his own ground, but when they find someone who comes out to meet them outside his own frontiers and who will, if the occasion arises, take the initiative in attack, they are not so ready to come to grips. “

END OF NINTH YEAR OF WAR

p.699

The Spartans manage to have to city of Mende co-opted by a small faction who acted against the majority opinion of the town.

When the Athenians circle about to take the city back, hilarity ensues due to the actions of the Spartan commander…

It was at this point inside the walls that the arms of the Mendaeans and their Peloponnesian allies were piled, and now Polydamidas began to form his men up for battle, encouraging the Mendaeans to make a sortie. But the Mendaeans were now split into two factions, and someone from the democratic party answered Polydamidas back and said that they would not go out and that they did not want a war. For this reply Polydamidas dragged the man forward by the arm and began to knock him about. This infuriated the people, who immediately seized hold of their weapons and set upon the Peloponnesians and those of the opposite party who were collaborating with the Peloponnesians. They routed them at the first attack, partly because the fighting had broken out so suddenly, partly through fear of the gates being opened to the Athenians, since it was thought that this attack was the result of some previous arrangement made with them. Those who were not killed on the spot took refuge in the acropolis, which they had held from the beginning. And now the whole Athenian army (for by this time Nicias had returned and was close to the city) burst into Mende.

BOOK FIVE

BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS

p.711

Outside Amphipolis, Brasidas takes a position that gives him a clear view of the movements of Cleon’s army. Cleon’s army, though better-equipped than Brasidas’, is under inferior leadership. Brasidas bides his time and waits to make his move.

Cleon’s arrogance and hubris is symbolic of that of Athens’ itself.

For some time Cleon made no move, but finally he was forced to do what Brasidas had expected. Inactivity made the soldiers discontented, and their thoughts began to turn to the comparison between the daring and skill of Brasidas and the incompetence and weakness of their own commander, whom, they remembered, they had been unwilling enough to follow even when they left home. Cleon was aware of this grumbling and, not wanting the army to get depressed by being constantly in the same position, he broke up his camp and moved forward. He was in the same confident frame of mind that he had been in at Pylos, where his success had convinced him of his intelligence. So now he had no idea that anyone would come out to fight him; he was just going up, he said, to examine the position, and the reason that he was waiting for reinforcements was not so as to have a margin of safety in case he was compelled to fight, but so as to be able to surround the city entirely and then take it by assault. So he went forward and posted his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis. He himself examined the marshes of the river Strymon and how the land lay on the Thracian side of the city. He thought he could retire whenever he wished without fighting, since no one was to be seen on the walls and no one came out of the gates, which were all shut. In fact it seemed to have been a mistake not to have brought siege engines with him, as then he might have taken the city in its defenceless state.

p.713

Brasidas, sensing the possible vulnerabilities in his own force, and also a fleeting opportunity to route his adversary, chose to use guerrilla tactics: hiding his force and attacking when his adversary is retiring.

As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenian army on the march, he came down from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis. He did not come out of the town and draw up his army to face the Athenians because he lacked confidence in his own forces and thought them inferior, not in numbers (they were about equal), but in quality, since the Athenians on this expedition were first-rate troops and with them were the best of the Lemnians and the Imbrians. Brasidas therefore prepared to attack in a less obvious manner. He thought that if he revealed to the enemy the numbers of his own troops and their rough-and-ready equipment, he would be less likely to win a victory than if he kept them out of sight, thus preventing his opponents from feeling a justifiable contempt for them. He therefore picked out 150 hoplites and, leaving the rest under the command of Clearidas, decided to make a sudden attack before the Athenians withdrew. He thought that, once their reinforcements arrived, he would never get another opportunity like this of catching them alone.

p.714

Brasidas explains the logic of his plan to his forces, using the element of surprise and taking advantage of the enemy’s overconfidence.

“It is, according to my calculations, because they despise us and because they have no idea that anyone will come out to fight them that the enemy have come up to the position in which they are and are now looking carelessly about them in no sort of order. But success goes to the man who sees more clearly when the enemy is making mistakes like this and who, making the most of his own forces, does not attack on obvious and recognized lines, but in the way that best suits the actual situation. And it is by these unorthodox methods that one wins the greatest glory; they completely deceive the enemy, and are of the greatest possible service to one’s own side. So at this juncture, while they are still confident and unready, while they are thinking, so far as I can see, more of slipping away than of standing their ground, in this moment when their spirits are relaxed, and before they have time to pull themselves together, I propose to charge out at the double with my own troops against the enemy’s centre, taking them, if possible, by surprise. You, Clearidas, afterwards, when you see that I am already in action and (as is probable) creating a panic among them, are to take your own troops, including the Amphipolitans and the other allies, and to open the gates suddenly, charge out, and get among the enemy as quickly as you can. This is the way in which we are most likely to make them frightened; for when a second force appears later on the scene it causes more terror among the enemy than the force with which he is actually fighting at the time. You, Clearidas, must show the qualities that one expects of a Spartan officer, and you allies must follow him boldly. Remember that what makes a good soldier is his readiness to fight, his sense of honour, and his discipline, and that this day, if you show yourselves men, will win you your freedom and the title of allies of Sparta; the alternative is slavery to Athens; here the best you could hope for would be not to be carried off to the slavemarket or put to death; otherwise your servitude would be harsher than what you have known in the past, and you would also hinder the liberation of the rest of the Hellenes. No, there must be no giving in on your side, seeing how much there is at stake. As for me, I shall show that I do not only give advice to other people, but am also able to practise what I preach.”

p.716

The attack, almost foiled, commences.

‘These people will never stand up to us. That is clear enough from all the jostling about of spears and heads. When soldiers get into that state they can hardly ever face an attack. Let me have the gates opened for me, as I ordered, and let us set on them as fast as we can. We are sure to win.’

The Athenians meanwhile had seen Brasidas coming down from Cerdylium, and had seen him in the city, into which they could look from outside, sacrificing near the temple of Athene and making various dispositions. Cleon at this time had gone farther forward to reconnoitre the ground, and it was now announced to him that the whole enemy army could be seen inside the city and that the feet of numbers of men and horses were visible under the gates, giving the impression that they were going to come out and attack. On hearing this, Cleon hurried to the spot. He saw what the position was and, since he did not wish to risk a general battle until his reinforcements arrived, and imagined that he would have time to withdraw, he gave orders for the retreat to be sounded. His instructions were for the army to fall back in the direction of Eion, and for the left wing to lead the way – which was, in fact, the only possible method of retiring. Then, thinking that he had plenty of time in hand, he personally began to lead away the right wing, making it wheel round, and so exposing its unarmed side to the enemy. It was at this point that Brasidas, seeing that his opportunity had come and that the Athenian army was on the move, said to his own troops and to the others: ‘These people will never stand up to us. That is clear enough from all the jostling about of spears and heads. When soldiers get into that state they can hardly ever face an attack. Let me have the gates opened for me, as I ordered, and let us set on them as fast as we can. We are sure to win.’

p.718

The action marks the end of Brasidas and Cleon. The Athenian army flees in disorder, a victory for Peloponnesians.

He then came out by the gate in the palisade and by the first gate in the long wall, which was then in existence. He went forward at the double straight along the road where, as one goes past the steepest part of the town, the trophy now stands, and he fell upon the Athenians, who were at the same time terrified by their own disorganized state and thrown off their balance by the audacity of his action. Here he routed the Athenian centre, and now Clearidas, following his instructions, charged out from the Thracian gates and bore down upon them too. The result was panic among the Athenians, attacked, as they were, suddenly, unexpectedly, and from two sides. Their left wing in the direction of Eion, which had already got some distance on its way, immediately broke and fled. Once this wing had given way, Brasidas turned against the right wing. Here he was wounded, but the Athenians did not realize that he had fallen, since he was lifted up by those about him and carried off the field.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGOS

p.737

Thucydides also gives a personal note about his experience during the war.

The history of this period also has been written by the same Thucydides, an Athenian, keeping to the order of events as they happened by summers and winters, down to the time when the Spartans and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens and occupied the Long Walls and Piraeus. By then the war had lasted altogether twenty-seven years. And it would certainly be an error of judgement to consider the interval of the agreement as anything else except a period of war. One has only to look at the facts to see that it is hardly possible to use the word ‘peace’ of a situation in which neither side gave back or received what had been promised; and apart from this there were breaches of the treaty on both sides in connection with the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, and in other respects, too; the allies in the Thracian area continued hostile as before; and the Boeotians were in a state of truce which had to be renewed every ten days. So, if one puts together the first ten years’ war, the uneasy truce which followed it, and the subsequent war, one will find, reckoning by summers and winters, that my estimate of the number of years is correct within a few days – also that, for those who put their faith in oracles, here is one solitary instance of their having been proved accurate. I myself remember that all the time from the beginning to the end of the war it was being put about by many people that the war would last for thrice nine years. I lived through the whole of it, being of an age to understand what was happening, and I put my mind to the subject so as to get an accurate view of it. It happened, too, that I was banished from my country for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis; I saw what was being done on both sides, particularly on the Peloponnesian side, because of my exile, and this leisure gave me rather exceptional facilities for looking into things. I shall now, therefore, go on to describe the disputes that took place after the ten years’ war, the breach of the treaty, and the warfare which came afterwards.

p.739

A peace is declared between Athens and Sparta after the first 10 years of the war. However, the allies of Sparta acted to undermine the terms of the peace. A conflict between Sparta and Argos is in the offing; there are suspicions amongst the allies of Sparta that Sparta is using the alliance with Athens to enslave them all, due a certain clause in the peace treaty.

… the time had now come for Argos to consider how the Peloponnese could be preserved; their suggestion was that a decree should be passed inviting any Hellenic state that chose, provided that such a state were independent and would deal with other states on a basis of legality and equality, to enter into a defensive alliance with Argos; for this purpose it would be better to appoint a few people with special powers rather than to negotiate through the popular assembly, so that secrecy could be preserved in the cases of those whose applications for alliance were not accepted. They said that many would want to join through hatred of the Spartans. After making these suggestions the Corinthians returned home.

The people in Argos with whom they had been in touch referred the proposal to the Government and to the people, and the Argives passed the decree and chose twelve men who were empowered to negotiate alliances with any Hellenic state that wished to do so, except for Sparta and Athens, neither of which was to be admitted unless the matter was first put before the people of Argos. The chief reason why the Argives adopted this policy was because they saw that war between them and Sparta was bound to come, now that their treaty was on the point of expiring, and also they hoped to gain the leadership of the Peloponnese. For this was the time when the reputation of Sparta had sunk very low indeed and she was despised for the losses she had suffered; whereas Argos was very well off in every direction, having taken no part in the Attic war, indeed having profited greatly from her position of neutrality.

…they accounted for Mantinea’s change of front by supposing her to have especial sources of information, and at the same time they were angry with Sparta, in particular because of the part of the treaty with Athens where it was laid down that no breach of oath would be involved if the Spartans and Athenians together wished to add or take away anything from the terms. It was this clause which was chiefly responsible for creating the disturbance throughout the Peloponnese and making the states suspect that Sparta was planning to enslave them with the aid of Athens. The right thing, they thought, was that alterations in the treaty should be made only with the consent of all the allies. There was consequently a general feeling of alarm, and state after state began to move in the direction of forming an alliance with Argos.

BATTLE OF MANTINEA

p.800

During the battle of Mantinea against Argos, Thucydides comments on Spartan tendencies during battle.

The Spartans will fight for a long time, stubbornly holding their ground until the moment they have put their enemy to flight; but once this moment comes they do not follow him up a great way or for long.

p.801

Thucydides comments that the Battle of Mantinea is a sort of return to form for the Spartans.

So by this one action they did away with all the reproaches that had been levelled against them by the Hellenes at this time, whether for cowardice, because of the disaster in the island, or for incompetence and lack of resolution on other occasions. It was now thought that, though they might have been cast down by fortune, they were still in their own selves the same as they always had been.

THE MELIAN DIALOGUE

p.811

Thucydides begins with a characteristically terse background description.

The Athenians also made an expedition against the island of Melos. They had thirty of their own ships, six from Chios, and two from Lesbos; 1,200 hoplites, 300 archers, and twenty mounted archers, all from Athens; and about 1,500 hoplites from the allies and the islanders.

The Melians are a colony from Sparta. They had refused to join the Athenian empire like the other islanders, and at first had remained neutral without helping either side; but afterwards, when the Athenians had brought force to bear on them by laying waste their land, they had become open enemies of Athens.

p.812

Negotiations are held between a few Melian leaders and the Athenian generals.

Now the generals Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the above force in Melian territory and, before doing any harm to the land, first of all sent representatives to negotiate. The Melians did not invite these representatives to speak before the people, but asked them to make the statement for which they had come in front of the governing body and the few.

p.813

The Athenians lay it bare: Melos faces destruction if it does not concede to Athens.

“If you are going to spend the time in enumerating your suspicions about the future, or if you have met here for any other reason except to look the facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can save your city from destruction, there is no point in our going on with this discussion. If, however, you will do as we suggest, then we will speak on.”

p.814

A condensed statement of political realism. The Athenians state that justice only applies in situations where there is equality of power. However, they are clearly the more powerful party, so they can do as they like.

“Instead we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”

p.815

The Athens shrug off the suggestion, and maintain that controlling and defeating one’s subjects is more important than the fear of being ruled by someone else. They lay down their ultimatum to the Melians.

“As for us, even assuming that our empire does come to an end, we are not despondent about what would happen next. One is not so much frightened of being conquered by a power which rules over others, as Sparta does (not that we are concerned with Sparta now), as of what would happen if a ruling power is attacked and defeated by its own subjects. So far as this point is concerned, you can leave it to us to face the risks involved. What we shall do now is to show you that it is for the good of our own empire that we are here and that it is for the preservation of your city that we shall say what we are going to say. We do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empire, and we want you to be spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves.”

…

“You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you.”

p.816

The Athenians must assimilate Melos, because to do otherwise would be a sign of weakness, and may incite revolt amongst its subjects.

Melians: So you would not agree to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side?

Athenians: No, because it is not so much your hostility that injures us; it is rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred is evidence of our power.

…

So far as right and wrong are concerned they think that there is no difference between the two, that those who still preserve their independence do so because they are strong, and that if we fail to attack them it is because we are afraid. So that by conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the security of our empire. We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker islanders too than the others; it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape.

…

As a matter of fact we are not so much frightened of states on the continent. They have their liberty, and this means that it will be a long time before they begin to take precautions against us. We are more concerned about islanders like yourselves, who are still unsubdued, or subjects who have already become embittered by the constraint which our empire imposes on them. These are the people who are most likely to act in a reckless manner and to bring themselves and us, too, into the most obvious danger.

p.818

The Athenians appeal to practicality, stating that there is no cause for shame in submitting to an obviously stronger party and living another day.

“No, not if you are sensible. This is no fair fight, with honour on one side and shame on the other. It is rather a question of saving your lives and not resisting those who are far too strong for you.”

p.819

Hope is a luxury, and only useful to those who can afford it. It is not something to be relied upon.

“Hope, that comforter in danger! If one already has solid advantages to fall back upon, one can indulge in hope. It may do harm, but will not destroy one. But hope is by nature an expensive commodity, and those who are risking their all on one cast find out what it means only when they are already ruined; it never fails them in the period when such a knowledge would enable them to take precautions. Do not let this happen to you, you who are weak and whose fate depends on a single movement of the scale. And do not be like those people who, as so commonly happens, miss the chance of saving themselves in a human and practical way, and, when every clear and distinct hope has left them in their adversity, turn to what is blind and vague, to prophecies and oracles and such things which by encouraging hope lead men to ruin.”

p.820

For the the Athenians, this world is a will to power, governed by a hierarchy of the strong, with the only motive being one of expansion and control. Furthermore, the Athenians point out that the Spartans are fickle and self-interested; not the type of allies that Melos would need in this situation.

“So far as the favour of the gods is concerned, we think we have as much right to that as you have. Our aims and our actions are perfectly consistent with the beliefs men hold about the gods and with the principles which govern their own conduct. Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way. And therefore, so far as the gods are concerned, we see no good reason why we should fear to be at a disadvantage. But with regard to your views about Sparta and your confidence that she, out of a sense of honour, will come to your aid, we must say that we congratulate you on your simplicity but do not envy you your folly. In matters that concern themselves or their own constitution the Spartans are quite remarkably good; as for their relations with others, that is a long story, but it can be expressed shortly and clearly by saying that of all people we know the Spartans are most conspicuous for believing that what they like doing is honourable and what suits their interests is just. And this kind of attitude is not going to be of much help to you in your absurd quest for safety at the moment.”

p.824

The Athenians make a final appeal to self-preservation, arguing that notions of honor are mere distractions, and in fact bring dishonor in a situation such as this.

“You will therefore be showing an extraordinary lack of common sense if, after you have asked us to retire from this meeting, you still fail to reach a conclusion wiser than anything you have mentioned so far. Do not be led astray by a false sense of honour – a thing which often brings men to ruin when they are faced with an obvious danger that somehow affects their pride. For in many cases men have still been able to see the dangers ahead of them, but this thing called dishonour, this word, by its own force of seduction, has drawn them into a state where they have surrendered to an idea, while in fact they have fallen voluntarily into irrevocable disaster, in dishonour that is all the more dishonourable because it has come to them from their own folly rather than their misfortune. You, if you take the right view, will be careful to avoid this. You will see that there is nothing disgraceful in giving way to the greatest city in Hellas when she is offering you such reasonable terms – alliance on a tribute-paying basis and liberty to enjoy your own property. “

p.828

After a siege, the fate of Melos is sealed.

Siege operations were now carried on vigorously and, as there was also some treachery from inside, the Melians surrendered unconditionally to the Athenians, who put to death all the men of military age whom they took, and sold the women and children as slaves. Melos itself they took over for themselves, sending out later a colony of 500 men.

BOOK SIX

SICILIAN ANTIQUITIES

p.829

The beginning of the end for Athens. Its hubris brings it into a war, in a distant land, with no local recourse or support.

IN the same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again against Sicily with larger forces than those which Laches and Eurymedon had commanded, and, if possible, to conquer it. They were for the most part ignorant of the size of the island and of the numbers of its inhabitants, both Hellenic and native, and they did not realize that they were taking on a war of almost the same magnitude as their war against the Peloponnesians.

LAUNCHING OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION

p.841

Nicias argues against launching an expedition to gain territory in Sicily.

“What I say is this: in going to Sicily you are leaving many enemies behind you, and you apparently want to make new ones there and have them also on your hands. Possibly you think that the peace treaty which you have made gives you security; and, so long as you make no move, no doubt this treaty will continue to exist in name (for it has become a nominal thing, thanks to the intrigues of certain people here and in Sparta); it will certainly not stop our enemies from attacking us immediately, if in any part of the world any considerable forces of our own should suffer a defeat. ”

…

“All these are points to be considered; we have not yet come safely into harbour, and this is no time for running risks or for grasping at a new empire before we have secured the one we have already.”

…

” It is senseless to go against people who, even if conquered, could not be controlled, while failure would leave us much worse off than we were before we made the attempt. My opinion is, too, that Sicily, as it is at present, is not a danger to us, and that it would be even less of a danger if it came under the control of Syracuse (the possibility with which the Egestaeans are always trying to frighten you).”

…

“The best way for us to make ourselves feared by the Hellenes in Sicily is not to go there at all; and the next best thing is to make a demonstration of our power and then, after a short time, go away again.”

…

“But one’s enemy’s misfortunes are insufficient grounds for self-satisfaction; one can only feel real confidence when one has mastered his designs. And we ought to realize that, as a result of the disgrace they have suffered, the Spartans have only one thought, and that is how they can even now regain their own reputation by overthrowing us – as is natural when one considers that military honour is the be-all and the end-all of their existence. So, if we keep our senses, we shall see that what we are fighting for has nothing to do with these Egestaeans in Sicily, who do not even speak our own language: our real problem is to defend ourselves vigorously against the oligarchical machinations of Sparta.”

p.855

Alcibiades, narcissistic and arrogant, argues for the expedition, demonstrating Athenian hubris. Expansion is self-justifying, an empire must be on-the-move and aggressive.

“One does not only defend oneself against a superior power when one is attacked; one takes measures in advance to prevent the attack materializing. And it is not possible for us to calculate, like housekeepers, exactly how much empire we want to have. The fact is that we have reached a stage where we are forced to plan new conquests and forced to hold on to what we have got, because there is a danger that we ourselves may fall under the power of others unless others are in our power. And you cannot look upon this idea of a quiet life in quite the same way as others do – not, that is, unless you are going to change your whole way of living and make it like theirs is.”

…

“Remember, too, that the city, like everything else, will wear out of its own accord if it remains at rest, and its skill in everything will grow out of date; but in conflict it will constantly be gaining new experience and growing more used to defend itself not by speeches, but in action. In general, my view is that a city which is active by nature will soon ruin itself if it changes its nature and becomes idle, and that the way that men find their greatest security is in accepting the character and the institutions which they actually have, even if they are not perfect, and in living as nearly as possible in accordance with them.”

p.859

The Athenians grow more enthusiastic for the expedition. Nicias points out the difficulties.

“We must start, then, with a force that is large enough for its task, and we must realize that we are going to sail a long way from our own country on an expedition very different from any of those which you may have undertaken against any of your subjects in this part of the world, when you have had your alliance to fall back on and when supplies have been easy to obtain from friendly territory. Instead of this, we are cutting ourselves off from home and going to an entirely different country, from which during the four winter months it is difficult even for a messenger to get to Athens.”

p.861

Nicias argues for a surfeit of resources for this expedition, emphasizing complete self-reliance in the undertaking.

“We must act on the assumption that we are going off to found a city among foreigners and among enemies, and that those who do this have either to become masters of the country on the very first day they land in it, or be prepared to recognize that, if they fail to do so, they will find hostility on every side. Fearing this and knowing that we shall have need of much good counsel and more good fortune (a hard thing to be sure of, since we are but men), I wish to leave as little as possible to fortune before I sail, and to set out with an army that, according to all reasonable probability, should be secure. This I believe to be the best way to guarantee the general interests of the city and the safety of those of us who are going to serve in the campaign. If anyone thinks differently, I invite him to take the command instead of me.”

THE DEBATE AT SYRACUSE

p.876

Rumors are flying about an impending Athenian invasion of Sicily. Opinions are varied amongst the Syracusans about the veracity of these rumors, and what the the response should be. A Syracusan, Hermocrates, argues for preparation and pre-emption, reciting the principle that preemptively attacking an attacker is the best defense. When war becomes inevitable, strike first.

“If all the Sicilians together, or at least as many of us as possible, would be prepared to launch every available ship and, taking two months’ supplies with us, would meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia and make it clear to them that before there is any question of fighting for Sicily they will have to fight for their passage across the Ionian sea, this would have the most powerful effect on their minds, and would force them to reflect that while we are there on guard with a base in friendly country (since Tarentum will receive us), they have a great stretch of open sea to cross with the whole of their expeditionary force, and that because of the length of the voyage it will be difficult for this force to keep its order, but easy for us to attack it as it comes up slowly and in detachments. “And if they, on their side, were to bring into action against us the whole body of their fast-sailing ships, having first lightened them of their burdens, we could either, assuming them to have been rowing for a long time, attack them when they were tired out, or, if we preferred it, we could always fall back on Tarentum; while they, on the other hand, would be short of rations, having crossed the sea simply in order to fight a battle, and would find themselves in difficulties lying off “his deserted part of the country. They would either have to stay where they were, and be blockaded, or else try to sail on along the coast, which would mean leaving behind the rest of their forces and facing the discouraging prospect of not knowing for certain whether the cities would receive them.

…

Then, too, the people who attack first, or at any rate make it clear to the aggressors that they are going to defend themselves, are the ones who are most feared, because it is then thought that they are ready to take up the challenge. This is just what would happen now to the Athenians. They are attacking us on the assumption that we are not going to defend ourselves, and they have a right to hold such a poor view of us, because we failed to help the Spartans to destroy them. But if they were to see us acting with a daring that they do not anticipate, they would be more frightened by the very unexpectedness of the thing than they would be by the power which we really have. It is this daring action, therefore, which I am most anxious that you should take; but if you will not, then I urge you to make every other preparation for war as quickly as possible. Let everyone remember that while contempt for an enemy’s attack can best be shown by the valiance with which one meets it, the most useful thing for us now is to act as though in the midst of danger and to realize that the safest steps we can take are those taken under the influence of fear. The Athenians are coming: the Athenians are, I am sure of it, already on their voyage: the Athenians are very nearly here.”

ATHENIAN VICTORY BEFORE SYRACUSE

p.913

The Athenians, milling about in Sicily before their first confrontation with Syracuse, make an easy target for the numerous and agile Syracusan cavalry, who taunt the Athenians with insults and vituperations.

Syracusan cavalry on reconnaissance was constantly riding up to the Athenian army and, among other insulting remarks used, asked them whether they had not really come to settle down in someone else’s land rather than to resettle the people of Leontini in their own.

THE DEBATE AT CAMARINA

p.933

Hemocrates, the Syracusan, and the Athenians converge upon Camarina, each party attempting to convince Camarina to ally with them. Hemocrates appeals to Camarina, using the classic dichotomy between the danger of freedom and the safety of slavery.

“Instead of this, you should be helping us, and you ought not to be afraid of their fleet and army; there is nothing there to be frightened of so long as we all stand together, but only if we fail to do this and drift apart – which is just what they are trying to bring about. You saw that even when they came against us by ourselves and defeated us in battle they failed to achieve their objects and had to retire at once.

There is therefore no reason for despondency so long as we stick together, and every reason for us to join wholeheartedly in the alliance, especially as help is coming to us from the Peloponnesians, who in military affairs are better than the Athenians in every way. ”

…

“If the Athenians conquer us, they will owe that achievement to your decision, but will receive the credit for it themselves, and will take as the prize of victory the very people who helped them to win it. If, on the other hand, the victory goes to us, you will scarcely escape paying the penalty for having been the cause of our danger. Think carefully, therefore, and now make your choice: you may either run no risks and become slaves at once, or else, standing together with us, you may save yourselves, and so both avoid the disgrace of being dominated by the Athenians and escape the lasting hatred which otherwise we should feel for you.”

ALCIBIADES IN SPARTA

p.947

At this point, Alcibiades has escaped prosecution in Athens and has defected to the Spartans. He is in a tenuous position, bearing the mark of traitor. Yet, he is able to use clever arguments to inspire the Spartans to offer military support to the Syracusans, which the Spartans, in typical fashion, are reluctant to do. Furthermore, he reveals the true scope of Athens’ designs on the Hellenic world.

“The first thing I must do is to deal with the prejudice which you feel against me, so that you may listen to matters of common interest without being biased by any suspicion of me personally. My ancestors used to hold the position of official representatives for Sparta in Athens; because of some misunderstanding they gave up this position, but I myself took it up again and put my services at your disposal, particularly with regard to the losses which you sustained at Pylos. I remained anxious to help you throughout, but when you made peace with Athens you negotiated through my personal enemies, thus putting them in a stronger position and discrediting me. You have therefore no right to blame me for the injuries you suffered when I turned to Mantinea and to Argos and opposed you in various other ways. And if in those days when you were actually suffering any of you were unreasonably angry with me, the time has now come for you to look at the matter in its true light and to change your views. Or if anyone thought the worse of me because I was rather on the side of the people , here again he should see that this was no good reason for being against me. My family has always been opposed to dictators; democracy is the name given to any force that opposes absolute power; and so we have continued to act as the leaders of the common people. Besides, since democracy was the form of government in Athens, it was necessary in most respects to conform to the conditions that prevailed. However in the face of the prevailing political indiscipline, we tried to be more reasonable.

p.949

The true scope of Athens’ ambitions in Hellenic world.

“So much for the things which have created prejudice against me. I now want you to listen to what I have to say on the subject which you are to discuss – a subject on which I am perhaps peculiarly well qualified to speak. We sailed to Sicily to conquer first, if possible, the Sicilians, and after them the Hellenes in Italy; next we intended to attack the Carthaginian empire and Carthage herself. Finally, if all or most of these plans were successful, we were going to make our assault on the Peloponnese, bringing with us all the additional Hellenic forces which we should have acquired in the west and hiring as mercenaries great numbers of native troops – Iberians and others who are now recognized as being the best fighting material to be found in those parts. In addition to our existing fleet we should have built many more triremes, since Italy is rich in timber, and with all of them we should have blockaded the coast of the Peloponnese, while at the same time our army would be operating on land against your cities, taking some by assault and others by siege. In this way we hoped that the war would easily be brought to a successful conclusion and after that we should be the masters of the entire Hellenic world. As for money and provisions, there could be no fear of them running short, since sufficient supplies were to be provided by our new conquests in the west without touching our revenues here in Hellas.”

“You have now heard from the man who knows most about it what were in fact the objects of the present expedition; and the generals who are left will, if they can, continue just the same to carry out these plans. What you must now realize is that, unless you help her, Sicily will be lost. The Sicilians lack the experience which Athens has, but might even now survive if they all united together. The Syracusans by themselves, however, whose total force has already been defeated in one battle and who are at the same time blockaded by sea, will not be able to hold out against the Athenian forces now in Sicily. And if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls with it, and Italy soon afterwards. It would not then be long before you were confronted with the dangers which I have just told you threatened you from the west. So do not imagine that it is only the question of Sicily that is under discussion; it will be the question of the Peloponnese unless you quickly take the following measures: you must send out to Sicily a force of troops that are able to row the ships themselves and to take the field as hoplites as soon as they land; and – what I consider even more useful than the troops – you must send out as commander a regular Spartan officer to organize the troops that are there already and to force into the service those who are there already and to force into the service those who are shirking their duty. This is the way to put fresh heart into your friends and make the waverers less frightened of joining in. Then, too, the war in Hellas must be carried on more openly. This will have the effect of stiffening Syracusan resistance, when they see that you are taking an interest in them, and will make it harder for the Athenians to reinforce their army in Sicily. And you must fortify Decelea in Attica; it is the thing of which the Athenians have always been most frightened, and they think that of all the adversities of the war this is the only one that they have not experienced.

The surest way of harming an enemy is to find out certainly what form of attack he is most frightened of and then to employ it against him. He is likely to know himself more accurately than anyone else where his danger lies, and that is why he is frightened. ”

…

“Most of the property in the area will come into your hands, some by capture, some without your having to move a finger. Athens will immediately be deprived of her revenues from the silver mines at Laurium and from what she gets at present from the land and from the law-courts. Most important of all, she will lose her tribute from the allies, since they will pay it in much less regularly and will cease to be overawed by Athens herself once they see that you are now really making war seriously. How quickly and how energetically these things are done depends on you, Spartans; I am perfectly confident that they can be done, and I do not think that I am likely to be wrong.”

p.953

Alcibiades addresses his reputation as a traitor.

“I claim also that none of you should think the worse of me if, in spite of my previous reputation for loving my country, I now join in vigorously with her bitterest enemies in attacking her; nor should you suspect my argument on the grounds that it derives simply from the strong feelings of an exile. I am an exile because of the villainy of the men who drove me out, not out of any wish, if you listen to me, to help you. And the worst enemies of Athens are not those who, like you, have only harmed her in war, but those who have forced her friends to turn against her. The Athens I love is not the one which is wronging me now, but that one in which I used to have secure enjoyment of my rights as a citizen. The country that I am attacking does not seem to me to be mine any longer; it is rather that I am trying to recover a country that has ceased to be mine. And the man who really loves his country is not the one who refuses to attack it when he has been unjustly driven from it, but the man whose desire for it is so strong that he will shrink from nothing in his efforts to get back there again. And so, Spartans, I think that you should not hesitate to make use of my services in every kind of danger or hardship. You should remember the argument that everyone uses and realize that just as I did you much harm when I was your enemy, so I can be of considerable service to you as a friend: of Athens I have certain knowledge, whereas with regard to Sparta I had to proceed by guesswork. My advice to you is to recognize that it is your basic interests which are now being discussed: you must not shrink from undertaking the campaigns in Sicily and in Attica; the presence of only a fraction of your forces in Sicily will ensure great results, and you will destroy both the present power and the future prospects of Athens. After that you yourselves will live in safety and be the leaders of the whole of Hellas, which will follow you voluntarily, not because of force, but from goodwill.”

BOOK SEVEN

FORTIFICATION OF DECELEA

p.998

The capture of the fort at Plemmyrium by the Syracusans was a decisive degradation of the Athenian warfighting capability at Syracuse, and is one of the causes of the eventual defeat of Athens in the war.

The Syracusans had not fared well in the naval engagement, but they held the forts in Plemmyrium and for these they put up three trophies. They dismantled one of the two forts last captured, but restored and garrisoned the other two. In the capture of the forts many men had been killed or taken prisoner, and a great deal of property altogether had fallen into the enemy’s hands. The Athenians had used the forts as a general depot and there had been inside them much property and corn belonging to the merchants, much also belonging to the captains; in fact the masts and other equipment for forty triremes were captured there, apart from three triremes which had been drawn up on shore. This capture of Plemmyrium was indeed the greatest and the principal cause of the deterioration of the Athenian army. Convoys with supplies were no longer safe even at the entrance to the harbour, since the Syracusans had ships waiting to intercept them, and it was now necessary to fight if supplies were to be brought in at all. In other respects too, this event had produced a feeling of bewilderment in the army and a decline in morale.

p.1002

On the advice of Alcibiades, the Spartans and their allies invaded Attica and fortified the town of Decelea, which is within sight of Athens. They used this as a base to lay waste to the countryside, unimpeded. Thucydides cites this as the primary cause of the Athenian defeat. It is ironic that it is not the Spartans’ own idea, but that of an Athenian defector, which ultimately defeats Athens.

The delusional thinking and lack of pragmatism of the Athenians seems to have also contributed to the Athenian defeat. What’s more, the massive defection of slaves and allies reveals that the base of their power was much more tenuous than they supposed.

Thucydides is harsh in reciting the fact that the Athenians had over-stretched themselves, engaging in two wars when one was already beyond their means.

In this same summer there arrived in Athens 1,300 peltasts from the Dii, one of the Thracian tribes who are armed with short swords. They were meant to have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes, and, as they had arrived too late for this, the Athenians resolved to send them back to Thrace, where they came from, since it seemed too expensive – each man was paid a drachma a day – to retain their services for dealing with the attacks made on them from Decelea.

The position was that, ever since Decelea had been first fortified by the whole of the invading army during the summer and had then been used as a hostile post against the country, with garrisons from the various cities relieving each other at fixed intervals, Athens had suffered a great deal. Indeed, the occupation ofDecelea, resulting, as it did, in so much devastation of property and loss of manpower, was one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power. The previous invasions had not lasted for long and had not prevented the Athenians from enjoying the use of their land for the rest of the time; now, however, the enemy were on top of them throughout the year; sometimes there were extra troops sent in to invade the country; sometimes it was only the normal garrison overrunning the land and making raids to secure supplies; and the Spartan King Agis was there in person, treating the whole operation as a major campaign. The Athenians therefore suffered great losses. They were deprived of the whole of their country; more than 20,000 slaves, the majority of whom were skilled workmen, deserted, and all the sheep and farm animals were lost. As the cavalry rode out to Decelea every day to make attacks on the enemy or to patrol the country, the horses were lamed on the rough ground and by the continuous hard work to which they were put, or else were wounded by the enemy. Then the supplies of food from Euboea, which previously had been brought in by the quicker route overland from Oropus through Decelea, now, at great expense, had to go by sea round Sunium. Every single thing that the city needed had to be imported, so that instead of a city it became a fortress. By day detachments took it in turn to mount guard on the battlements, by night all except the cavalry were on duty, some at the various armed posts and others on the walls. So, summer and winter, there was no end to their hardships. What wore them down more than anything else was the fact that they had two wars on their hands at once, and indeed they had got themselves into such a state of obstinate resolution that no one would have believed it possible if he had been told of it before it actually happened. For it was incredible that, besieged by the Peloponnesians who were based on a fortress in Attica, they should not only not leave Sicily, but actually stay on and lay siege in just the same way to Syracuse, a city which was in itself as big as Athens, and should give the Hellenic world such an astonishing demonstration of their power and of their daring; how astonishing can be seen from the fact that at the beginning of the war some thought that, if the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, Athens might survive for a year, and while others put the figure at two or three years, no one imagined she could last for more than that; yet now, in the seventeenth year after the first invasion, having suffered every kind of hardship already in the war, here were the Athenians going out to Sicily and taking upon themselves another war on the same scale as that which they had been waging all this time with the Peloponnesians.

For all these reasons – the great damage done by the occupation of Decelea and the other heavy expenses which fell upon them – the Athenians were becoming embarrassed financially, and it was about this time that they imposed upon their subjects a tax of five per cent on all imports and exports by sea, thinking that this would bring in more money. Expenditure was not the same as it had been, but had grown bigger as the war grew bigger, while revenue was declining.

p.1006

The war had brutalized the Athenians, as evidenced by the massacre they and their Thracian mercenaries had committed at the city of Mycalessus.

The Thracian barbarian mercenaries “like all the most bloodthirsty barbarians, are always particularly bloodthirsty when everything is going their own way”.

The inhabitants were caught off their guard, since they never expected that anyone would come so far from the sea to attack them. Their wall, too, was weak and in some places had collapsed, while in others it had not been built at all high, and the gates were open, since they had no fear of being attacked. The Thracians burst into Mycalessus, sacked the houses and temples, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither the young nor the old, but methodically killing everyone they met, women and children alike, and even the farm animals and every living thing they saw. For the Thracian race, like all the most bloodthirsty barbarians, are always particularly bloodthirsty when everything is going their own way. So now there was confusion on all sides and death in every shape and form. Among other things, they broke into a boys’ school, the largest in the place, into which the children had just entered, and killed every one of them. Thus disaster fell upon the entire city, a disaster more complete than any, more sudden and more horrible.

…

Mycalessus lost a considerable part of its population. It was a small city, but in the disaster just described its people suffered calamities as pitiable as any which took place during the war.

ATHENIAN DEFEAT IN THE GREAT HARBOUR

ATHENIAN DEFEAT AT EPIPOLAE

p.1042

After the Athenian defeats in the Syracusan harbor and Epipolae, the Athenians were utterly disheartened and shocked.

This was indeed a great victory for the Syracusans, and it had been won at sea, where until now they had been afraid of the naval reinforcements which had come with Demosthenes. The Athenians were now utterly disheartened; they could scarcely believe that this had happened, and they wished all the more that the expedition had never been made. These were the only cities they had come up against which were of the same type as their own, democracies like themselves, and places of considerable size, equipped with naval and cavalry forces. They had been unable to make use of a fifth column or to offer the prospect of a change in the form of government as a means for gaining power over them; nor had they been able to exploit a great superiority in material force; instead most of their efforts had been unsuccessful; even before this they had not known what to do, and now, after this wholly unexpected defeat at sea, they were at their wits’ end.

SYRACUSAN VICTORY AT SEA

p.1052

After their defeats, it has was high time for the Athenians to escape before their supplies were exhausted, for they had not sent for any resupplies from Catana.

Their plan was to break through the blockade at the mouth of the harbor. Failing that, they would escape by land to whatever friendly territory they could find in Sicily.

Nicias gives a speech to his troops before the operation, speaking of the nature of confidence and how it can be fleeting in the face of single staggering defeat, despite many years of experience which teaches that bad things occasionally happen.

“Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, the struggle in front of us involves us all, and each one of us, just as much as the enemy, will be fighting for his life and for his country, since, if we win this battle with our ships, each man can see again his own native city, wherever it may be. But we must not be downhearted or behave like people with no experience, who, if they lose the first battles, are frightened ever afterwards and think that things will always turn out in the same way. On the contrary, you Athenians here, who have already had experience of many wars, and you allies of ours who have constantly fought at our side, must remember that there is an unpredictable element in warfare and, in the hope that we, too, may have fortune with us, you must be prepared to go into battle gain and fight worthily of this great army of yours which you can see with your own eyes.”

p.1054

During Nicias’ speech, he addresses the sailors, who seem to not be Athenian citizens, but rather those of allies or other states within the Athenian sphere of influence.

His statements reveal the nature of empire, and how non-native peoples, who, through their assimilation of Athenian language and culture, are viewed as stakeholders in the empire.

This is analogous to the barbarian troops of the late Roman empire, or immigrant soldiers of modern states.

As for the sailors, I advise them, in fact I beg and entreat them, not to be too much cast down by past events. Think of the pleasure it is and how much worth preserving that all this time you, though not really Athenians, have, through knowledge of our language and imitation of our way of life, been considered as Athenians and been admired for it throughout Hellas, that you have had your proper share in all the advantages of our empire, while in the respect shown to you by our subjects and in freedom from ill treatment you have had even more than your share. So, since with you alone we freely share our empire, it is only right that you should not betray it now.

p.1057

Gylippus, seeing the Athenian preparations, makes a speech to his troops, addressing a different aspect of the nature of confidence:

Neophytes are often hungry, and feel no special entitlement to success, and thus have to fight for it, sometimes with great vigor due to their desire. When defeat comes, they try again, and continue onward towards their objectives, often improving themselves beyond their natural abilities.

Those who are naturally gifted, or otherwise feel entitled to success, often have an existential crisis when defeated, which makes them less effective than they should be.

“Syracusans and allies, we think that most of you are aware of the honour which we have won already and of the honour which remains to be won in the coming battle. Otherwise you would not have gone after it so bravely. But if there is anyone who does not realize this as fully as he should, we will explain it to him. The Athenians came to this country first of all to enslave Sicily and then, if successful in that, to enslave the Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas. They already possessed the greatest empire that ever has been possessed by Hellenes, past or present. You were the first people to stand up to their navy, which gave them everything, and in the battles fought on sea you have already defeated them before now, and there is good reason to suppose you will do so again on this occasion. When people think that they are especially good at something and find that it is just here that they are frustrated, the whole view that they take of themselves alters and they become less confident than they would have been if they had never believed in their superiority in the first place: the unexpectedness of their failure to make good their pretensions produces a tendency to give in even when this is unjustified by the actual strength which they have available. This, in all probability, is now

happening to the Athenians. With us, however, the spirit which we had originally, and which enabled us to go out and seek danger while we were still inexperienced, is now the firmer, and added to that is the conviction that, after having beaten the champions, we are the champions ourselves. So each man’s hope is doubled; and in going into action it is generally the case that where hopes are highest hearts are stoutest.”

p.1059

Gylippus entreats his men to act in a spirit of merciless vengeance against their would-be enslavers.

“And so against these men, our greatest enemies, disorganized as they are and betrayed by their own fortune, let us go into battle with anger in our hearts; let us be convinced that in dealing with an adversary it is most just and lawful to claim the right to slake the fury of the soul in retaliation on the aggressor, and also that we shall have that greatest of all pleasures, which consists, according to the proverb, in taking vengeance on an enemy. That they are not only enemies but the most deadly enemies of all is known to each one of you, since it was to enslave our country that they came here and, if they had been successful, they would have inflicted upon our men the bitterest of pains, have heaped upon our children and wives the greatest of outrages, and given to the whole city the most shameful of names. There is no excuse, therefore, for any softening of the heart or any feeling that it would be a good thing for us if they went away without bringing us into any further danger. They will do that in any case, even if they win. But we fight for something that is worth fighting for, if our wishes are, as we can expect, fulfilled, if we inflict the proper punishment on these men and hand down to the whole of Sicily the liberty which she used to enjoy, but now more firmly established than before. Of all risks that can be run these are the rarest, when failure brings no great loss and success confers no little gain.”

DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN EXPEDITION

p.1089

After destruction at sea, and a further winnowing-down on land, the Athenians retreat into the countryside, being cut off, ambushed, and otherwise harassed by the Syracusans. The Athenian force splits in two due to disorder, one group under Nicias, the other under Demosthenes.

Nicias’ group crosses the river Assinarius. The scene is one of utter desparation.

The Athenians hurried on towards the river Assinarus, partly because they were under pressure from the attacks made upon them from every side by the numbers of cavalry and the masses of other troops, and thought that things would not be so bad if they got to the river, partly because they were exhausted and were longing for water to drink. Once they reached the river, they rushed down into it, and now all discipline was at an end. Every man wanted to be the first to get across, and, as the enemy persisted in his attacks, the crossing now became a difficult matter. Forced to crowd in close together, they fell upon each other and trampled each other underfoot; some were killed immediately by their own spears, others got entangled among themselves and among the baggage and were swept away by the river. Syracusan troops were stationed on the opposite bank, which was a steep one. They hurled down their weapons from above on the Athenians, most of whom, in a disordered mass, were greedily drinking in the deep river-bed. And the Peloponnesians came down and slaughtered them, especially those who were in the river. The water immediately became foul, but nevertheless they went on drinking it, all muddy as it was and stained with blood; indeed, most of them were fighting among themselves to have it.

Finally, when the many dead were by now heaped upon each other in the bed of the stream, when part of the army had been destroyed there in the river, and the few who managed to get away had been cut down by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, telling him and the Spartans to do what they liked with him personally, but to stop the slaughter of his soldiers.

p.1090

The surviving Athenian soldiers end up in an ancient version of a concentration camp.

Those who were in the stone quarries were treated badly by the Syracusans at first. There were many of them, and they were crowded together in a narrow pit, where, since there was no roof over their heads, they suffered first from the heat of the sun and the closeness of the air; and then, in contrast, came on the cold autumnal nights, and the change in temperature brought disease among them. Lack of space made it necessary for them to do everything on the same spot; and besides there were the bodies all heaped together on top of one another of those who had died from their wounds or from the change of temperature or other such causes, so that the smell was insupportable. At the same time they suffered from hunger and from thirst. During eight months the daily allowance for each man was half a pint of water and a pint of corn. In fact they suffered everything which one could imagine might be suffered by men imprisoned in such a place. For about ten weeks they lived like this all together; then, with the exception of the Athenians and any Greeks from Italy or Sicily who had joined the expedition, the rest were sold as slaves. It is hard to give the exact figure, but the whole number of prisoners must have been at least 7,000.

BOOK EIGHT

ALARM AT ATHENS

p.1092

The Athenians were completely shocked into disbelief by their defeat in Sicily.

Moreover, they realized how the failed expedition had depleted their resources.

Nevertheless, their sense of invulnerability seems to have persisted, as shown through their imposition of order and doubling down on the war effort.

WHEN the news reached Athens, for a long time people would not believe it, even though they were given precise information from the very soldiers who had been present at the event and had escaped; still they thought that this total destruction was something that could not possibly be true. And when they did recognize the facts, they turned against the public speakers who had been in favour of the expedition, as though they themselves had not voted for it, and also became angry with the prophets and soothsayers and all who at the time had, by various methods of divination, encouraged them to believe that they would conquer Sicily. They were feeling the stress in every department and on every front, and now, after this last blow, great indeed was the fear that beset them and the consternation. Not only was the state as a whole and the mind of every man in it “weighed down by the thought of the loss of so many hoplites, cavalry, and men of military age who, they saw, could not be replaced; they saw, too, that the numbers of ships in the docks were inadequate, as was the money in the treasury, and that there were no crews for the ships. So at the moment they had little hope of being able to survive; they thought that their enemies in Sicily, after their great victory, would set sail immediately with their fleet for Piraeus, that their enemies at home would now most certainly redouble their efforts and attack them with all their might by land and sea, and that their own allies would revolt and join in the attack. Nevertheless, with their limited resources, it was decided that they must not give in; they would equip a fleet, getting the timber from wherever they could; they would raise money, and see that their allies, particularly Euboea, remained loyal; and in Athens itself they would take measures of economy and reform, appointing a body of older men to give their advice on the situation, whenever the occasion arose. In fact, like all democracies, now that they were terrified, they were ready to put everything in order. Their decisions were carried out at once, and so the summer came to an end.

p.1094

So despised was their hegemony, that the greatest immediate danger to Athens was the revolt of its allies.

Next winter the whole of Hellas, after the great disaster in Sicily, turned immediately against Athens. Those who had not been allied with either side thought that, even though they were not asked, they ought not to keep out of the war any longer and should go against the Athenians of their own accord, since the Athenians, in the view of each state, would have gone against them, if they had been successful in Sicily, and at the same time they thought that the war would soon be over and that they would gain credit from taking part in it. And those who were allies of Sparta were all the more eager than before to be freed quickly from all the sufferings they had endured so long. In particular the subjects of Athens were all ready to revolt; indeed they were more ready than able, since they were incapable of taking a dispassionate view of things, and would not admit the possibility that Athens might survive the coming summer. In Sparta all this produced a mood of confidence, and what was even more encouraging was the probability that in the spring they would be joined by their allies from Sicily in great force and now with the additional advantage of the navy which they had had to build. And so, with good reasons for confidence in every direction, the Spartans determined to throw themselves into the war without any reservations, calculating that, when once it was successfully over, they would be free for the future from the kind of danger which might have beset them if Athens had added the resources of Sicily to her own, and that, when the power of Athens had been destroyed, they themselves would be left secure in the leadership of all Hellas.

THE OLIGARCHIC COUP

p.1142

Alcibiades, in his dealings in Ionia with the Persian Tissaphernes during the Peloponnesian expeditions in the area, had incurred a certain amount of suspicion from his Spartan hosts.

His example shows how once one betrays a side in a conflict, he garners distrust from all sides.

At this time, and even earlier, before they moved to Rhodes, the following intrigues were going on. After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades became suspect to the Peloponnesians, and a letter was sent by them from Sparta to Astyochus with orders to put him to death. He was a personal enemy of Agis and was generally considered unreliable. In his alarm Alcibiades first sought refuge with Tissaphernes and then used his influence with him to do all the harm he possibly could to the cause of the Peloponnesians. He became his adviser in everything, and it was he who cut down the rate of pay so that, instead of an Attic drachma, only three obols a day were offered, and even that not regularly. He told Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians had had longer experience than they had in running a navy and only gave their own men three obols a day, not so much because they could not afford more, as in order to prevent their sailors getting out of hand through having too much and either impairing their fitness by spending money on the kind of things which lead to bad health or deserting their ships, as they might do, if they were not leaving behind arrears of pay as a security for their proper conduct. He also advised him to bribe the captains of triremes and the commanders from the various states so as to secure their agreement, except for the Syracusans. And Hermocrates was the only one of them who opposed him on behalf of the whole allied force.

p.1143

Alcibiades then tries to play the Athenians and Peloponesians against each other.

He appeals to his new Persian patron by suggesting that they let Athens and Sparta wear each other down.

It is also impressive that, at this point, Sparta is a naval power comparable to Athens, fulfilling Archidamus’ intentions, as recounted earlier in the history. In fact, the power of Sparta and the Peloponnesian League is becoming a major worry for the Persians.

To Tissaphernes Alcibiades also gave the advice not to be in too much of a hurry to end the war and not to consent to bring in the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping or to take more Hellenes into his pay; the result of this would be to give the control of both land and sea to one Power, whereas it was better to have the two parties each in possession of its own separate sphere of influence, so that if the King had trouble with one of them, he would always be able to call in the other against it. If, on the other hand, one State were to gain control of both the land and the sea, the King would be at a loss where to find allies to help to undermine its supremacy, unless he was prepared in the end to come forward himself and, at the cost of great expense and great danger, fight it out to the finish. It was more economical to let the Hellenes wear each other out among themselves while the King incurred only a fraction of the expense and none of the risk. Alcibiades said also that he would find that the Athenians were the better people with whom to share power: they were not so ambitious to acquire an empire on land, and both their policy and their actions in the war fitted in best with the King’s interests, since an alliance with the Athenians would be on the basis of conquering the sea for Athens and conquering for the King those Hellenes who lived in the King’s territory, whereas the Spartans, on the other hand, had come as liberators and it was hardly likely that, after liberating Hellenes from their fellow Hellenes, they would not also free them from subjugation to foreigners, unless the King could get rid of them first. Alcibiades therefore recommended him first to wear both sides out and then, after weakening the power of Athens as much as possible, to get the Peloponnesians out of the country at once. Tissaphernes on the whole agreed with this policy, or appears to have done so, judging from his actions. He took Alcibiades into his confidence on the strength of his having given such good advice on these subjects; he was niggardly about providing the pay for the Peloponnesians and he opposed the idea of their fighting a battle at sea; instead he pretended that the Phoenician ships were coming and that they could then fight with all the advantages on their side. Thus he did them a lot of harm and caused a decline in the morale and efficency of their navy, which had been very great. Altogether, in a manner too obvious to be mistaken, he showed an unreadiness to help them in the war.

p.1153

Alcibiades tries to engineer a way to return to Athens by brokering a deal between the Persians and Athenians, thereby shifting the balance of power in the conflict and helping the desperate Athenians. He is in communication with Athenian generals at Samos.

After this Alcibiades went on with his attempts to persuade Tissaphernes to become the friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes himself was afraid of the Peloponnesians because they had more ships on the spot than the Athenians; on the other hand, he was still willing to be won over, if he could see his way to it,

…

p.1154

At the instigation of Alcibiades, Pisander and several other Athenians set out from Samos to engineer a change in the Athenian constitution and institute an oligarchy.

Alcibiades’ intent behind this is to vanquish his political enemies in Athens and set up a government more favorable to an alliance with Persia and more desirable to Persia.

The arguments used by Pisander, namely that the change in government is reversible and is needed in the present time of danger, are seen in similar circumstances throughout history.

And now Pisander and the other representatives of the Athenians sent out from Samos reached Athens and spoke in front of the people, giving them a general idea of their programme and pointing out in particular that if they recalled Alcibiades and if they changed the democratic constitution, it would be possible for them to have the King as their ally and to win the war against the Peloponnesians. Much opposition was expressed with regard to altering the democracy; there was a great outcry from the enemies of Alcibiades at the idea of his being brought back from exile in a manner which involved breaking the law; and the priestly families of the Eumolpidae and the Ceryces lodged their protests on behalf of the mysteries – which had been the reason for his banishment – and in the name of the gods prohibited his return. Pisander then came forward in the face of a great deal of violent opposition and, taking separately each one of those who had spoken against his proposals, asked him the following question: ‘Now that the Peloponnesians have as many ships as we have ready to fight us at sea, now that they have more cities as their allies, and now that the King and Tissaphernes are supplying them with money, while ours is all gone, have you any hope that Athens can survive unless someone can persuade the King to change sides and come over to us?’ When they replied that they had not, he then spoke straight out and said to them: ‘Well, then, that is impossible unless we have a more integrated form of government, with the power in fewer hands, so that the King may trust us. At the moment what we have to think about is our survival, not the form of our constitution. (We can always change that later, if we do not like it.) And we must bring Alcibiades back, because he is the only person now living who can arrange this for us.’

The idea of an oligarchy was very badly received by the people at first, but when Pisander had made it perfectly clear that there was no other way out, their fears (and also the fact that they expected to be able to change the constitution again later) made them give in. They voted that Pisander and ten others should sail out and make whatever arrangements seemed best to them with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.

p.1165

The Athenian forces at Samos come to the conclusion that the democracy in Athens must be overthrown and replaced with an oligarchy.

After Pisander and the other delegates had returned to Samos from Tissaphernes they still further strengthened their control over the army itself, and made approaches to the most important people in Samos with a view to getting them to join in setting up an oligarchy, in spite of the fact that the Samians had just had an anti-oligarchical revolution. At the same time the Athenians in Samos discussed matters among themselves and decided that, as for Alcibiades, they would leave him alone, since he did not want to join them (nor did he seem the proper person to come into an oligarchy anyway); meanwhile they would take matters into their own hands, since they were compromised already, and see how they could keep their movement going; at the same time they would continue to hold out against the enemy in the war, and would willingly contribute money and anything else required from their private estates, since the hardships now to be incurred were not so much for the sake of other people as for themselves.

p.1166

Pisander and others set off for Athens to implement the coup, overthrowing democracies in various cities along the way. However, the cities do not necessarily fall into a new Athenian oligarchical orbit, but rather establish complete independence. It seems they were unconvinced or otherwise alienated from the supposed advantages of Athenian vassalage.

Within two months after he left, the Thasians began to fortify their city, considering that they had no longer anything to gain from an aristocratic government which attached them to Athens, when every day they expected to gain their freedom from Sparta. There were already some of them who had been exiled by the Athenians and were now with the Peloponnesians and, in collaboration with their friends inside the city, doing their utmost to have a fleet sent and to bring about the revolt of the island. These people saw things going exactly as they wished: their city was being set straight without involving them in any risks, and the democracy, which would have opposed them, had been suppressed. So with regard to Thasos the measures taken by the Athenian oligarchical party had the opposite effect to that intended, and, in my opinion, the same thing happened in a number of other subject states. As soon as the cities had got governments where the power was more concentrated and where there was no fear of having once’s practices denounced, they went straight on to complete freedom, and were not in the least attracted by the unreality of what the Athenians offered as ‘reform’.

p.1167

Pisander and other set off for Athens to implement the coup. Already, a group of young men had undertaken some initial purging of political enemies to please Alcibiades. These young men could be seen as political foot-soldiers; thugs wielding violence.

Propaganda is employed to lay the groundwork for the seizure of absolute power by the oligarchic party.

On their voyage Pisander and the others abolished the democracies in the cities, as had been decided. From some places they also took hoplites to add to their forces, and so came to Athens. Here they found that most of the work had already been done by members of their party. Some of the younger men had formed a group among themselves and had murdered without being detected a certain Androcles, who was one of the chief leaders of the popular party and had also been largely responsible for the banishing of Alcibiades. They had, therefore, two reasons for assassinating him – because he was a demagogue and because they imagined they would be doing something to please Alcibiades, who, they thought, was coming back from exile and bringing with him the friendship of Tissaphernes. There were also some other people whom they regarded as undesirable and did away with secretly. In public they put forward a programme demanding that no one should draw pay except members of the armed forces, and that the number of those with a share in the government should be limited to 5,000, and that these should be the people best qualified to serve the State either in their own proper persons or financially.

This was merely a piece of propaganda designed for the general public, since it was “the revolutionaries themselves who were going to take over power in the city.

p.1169

The party establishes puppet assemblies where only pre-approved decisions can be made, speakers are pre-selected, and speeches are also pre-approved. It is the ultimate form of narrative control. Those who speak against the narrative are removed and done away with.

Self-censorship out of fear becomes the norm. Mutual suspicion and distrust is pervasive. The projection of the party as omniscient and ever-present is achieved, despite its relatively limited actual power.

Nevertheless the Assembly and the Council chosen by lot still continued to hold meetings. However, they took no decisions that were not approved by the party of the revolution; in fact all the speakers came from this party, and what they were going to say had been considered by the party beforehand. People were afraid when they saw their numbers, and no one now dared to speak in opposition to them. If anyone did venture to do so, some appropriate method was soon found for having him killed, and no one tried to investigate such crimes or take action against those suspected of them. Instead the people kept quiet, and were in such a state of terror that they thought themselves lucky enough to be left unmolested even if they had said nothing at all. They imagined that the revolutionary party was much bigger than it really was, and they lost all confidence in themselves, being unable to find out the facts because of the size of the city and because they had insufficient knowledge of each other. For the same reason it was impossible for anyone who felt himself ill-treated to complain of it to someone else so as to take measures in his own defence; he would either have had to speak to someone he did not know or to someone he knew but could not rely upon. Throughout the democratic party people approached each other suspiciously, everyone thinking that the next man had something to do with what was going on. And there were in fact among the revolutionaries some people whom no one could ever have imagined would have joined in an oligarchy. It was these who were mainly responsible for making the general mass of people so mistrustful of each other and who were of the greatest help in keeping the minority safe, since they made mutual suspicion an established thing in the popular assemblies.

p.1170

The narrowing of the power structure is undertaken to form the core of the oligarchical government.

This was the state of affairs when Pisander and the others arrived. They immediately did what was left to do. First they called a general assembly and proposed that a committee of ten should be chosen and given full powers; these men should draw up their proposals and on a fixed day should put before the people their ideas for the best possible government. Next, when the day came, they held the assembly in a narrow space at Colonus, about a mile out of the city, on ground sacred to Poseidon. Here the committee brought forward one proposal and one only, which was that any Athenian should be allowed to make whatever suggestions he liked with impunity; heavy penalties were laid down for anyone who should bring a case against such a speaker for violating the laws or who should damage him in any other way. Now was the time for plain speaking, and it was at once proposed that the holding of office and drawing of salaries under the present constitution should now end; that five men should be elected as presidents; that these should choose 100 men, and each of the l00 should choose three men; that this body of 400 should enter the Council chamber with full powers to govern as they thought best, and should convene the 5,000 whenever they chose.

It was Pisander who proposed this resolution and who in general showed himself most openly in favour of doing away with the democracy.

p.1173

Power is seized when the citizens are separated from their arms. The coup plotters have easy access to them, as to put down any opposition quickly through violence. The “pioneers” do the dirty work.

The assembly, after ratifying the proposals, with no word spoken in opposition, was dissolved. Next they brought the Four Hundred into the Council chamber in the following way. Because of the enemy at Decelea all Athenians were constantly either on the walls or standing by near their arms at the various posts. On the day in question, therefore, they let those who were not in the secret go home as usual, and gave instructions to the members of their own party to wait about quietly, not actually by the arms, but at a little distance away, and, if there was any opposition shown to what was being done, to seize the arms and suppress it. There were also some Andrians and Tenians, 300 Carystians, and some of the colonists from Aegina, who had been sent out there to live by the Athenians. All these had come specially for this purpose with their own arms, and had been given the same instructions as the others. When they were all in their positions, the Four Hundred appeared, each carrying a dagger concealed on his person and accompanied by the 120 ‘Hellenic youths’ whom they made use of when there was any rough work to be done. Coming in upon the members of the Council chosen by lot who were sitting in the Council chamber, they told them to take their pay and go. They had brought with them themselves all the pay due to them for the rest of their term of office and gave it to them as they went out.

p.1174

The coup is completed as the 400 take their seats in the Council.

When the Council had made way for them like this, with no objection raised, and the rest of the citizens kept quiet and took no kind of action, the Four Hundred took their places in the Council chamber, and for the moment occupied themselves with choosing by lot officers from among themselves to deal with the Council business and in making the prayers and sacrifices to the gods that are made on entering office. Afterwards, however, they made great changes in what had been the democratic system of government, though they took no steps to recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades; but in other respects they ruled the city with a strong hand.

Some men, though not many, whom they thought it convenient to be done away with, were put to death; others were imprisoned or sent into exile.

p.1191

The Persian Tissarphenes, in collusion with the Peloponnesian Astyochus, is deliberately underpaying the crews of the Peloponnesian fleet, as to impair their efficiency. He seeks to keep both the Athenians and Peloponnesians at parity so they can weaken each other, to the Persians’ advantage.

One of the results of these discussions of their grievances was a disturbance which threatened Astyochus personally. Most of the Syracusan and Thurian crews were free men, and were consequently all the more outspoken in crowding round Astyochus and demanding their pay. Astyochus, however, answered them arrogantly and with threats; and when Dorieus spoke to him on behalf of his own sailors he went so far as to raise his stick against him. When the general mass of the men saw this happening they lost all control, as sailors do, and set on Astyochus to stone him. However, he saw what they were about and took refuge at an altar, and so the incident ended without his being stoned.

p.1197

Tissaphernes further keeps the Peloponnesians in stasis by pretending to fetch a supporting Phoenician fleet. His prevarications and underpayment cause the Peloponnesian fleet much woe.

In the same summer Tissaphernes made ready to go to Aspendus to fetch the Phoenician fleet, and invited Lichas to accompany him. This was just at the time when, because of his general behaviour, and particularly because of the recall of Alcibiades, he was most unpopular with the Peloponnesians, who thought that he was now quite openly collaborating with the Athenians, and Tissaphernes wanted, or made it look as though he wanted, to to clear himself of these suspicions. He said that he would leave behind his deputy Tamos with instructions to provide pay for the forces during his absence. Different explanations are given, and it is not easy to be sure what his intention was in going to Aspendus and then, when he had got there, in not bringing back the ships. It is certain that 147 Phoenician ships came as far as Aspendus; various conjectures have been made to account for their not coming on from there. According to one view he went away in accordance with his original plan of wearing down the Peloponnesian forces; and certainly Tamos, whose job it was, paid them worse instead of better. Others say that his purpose in bringing the the Phoenicians to Aspendus was to make money out of the crews, whom he never intended to employ in any case, and who would pay to be discharged. Another theory is that it was because of the attacks being made against him in Sparta, and that he wanted to have it said that he was not in the wrong, but had actually set out to fetch a fleet which really did have its full complement of men. I myself feel quite sure that his motives in not bringing up the fleet were to wear down the Hellenic forces and to keep matters in suspense: their efficiency was being impaired during all the time he took going down to Aspendus and waiting about there; and he was keeping the two sides evenly balanced, by not committing himself to either side and so giving it the advantage. Certainly his intervention, so long as there was nothing irresolute about it, could, if he had really wanted it, have put an end to the war. By bringing up the fleet he would in all probability have given victory to the Spartans who already faced the Athenians with a naval force that was equal to theirs rather than inferior. Then there is a most convincing piece of evidence in the excuse he gave for not bringing the ships. What he said was that fewer ships had been collected than the King had ordered; but in that case he could surely have gained all the more credit by not spending much of the King’s money and by using smaller means to effect the same result.

p.1200

The Oligarchic Coup in Athens begins to fracture. It is already opposed by the Athenian forces at Samos. Alcibiades is constantly engaged in machinations between the Oligarchs, forces at Samos, and Tissaphernes. It’s never clear which side he is on.

Most of those involved in the oligarchy were, even before this, discontented with it and would have been glad enough to get out of the business, if they could do so safely; and this message made them all the more determined to do so. They now began to organize themselves into an opposition and to criticize the way things were being run. They had as their leaders some of the people who were in the inner circles of the oligarchy and holders of office, such as Theramenes, the son of Hagnon, and Aristocrates, the son of Scellias, and others – men who, though they were holding important positions in the oligarchy, were afraid, they said, of the army in Samos and of Alcibiades (and in his case their fear was quite genuine), and also that those who had gone to Sparta to negotiate might do some harm to the State without consulting the majority of the party.

…

This, in fact, was mere political propaganda: it was for motives of personal ambition that most of them were following the line that is most disastrous to oligarchies when they take over from democracies. For no sooner is the change made than every single man, not content with being the equal of others, regards himself as greatly superior to everyone else. In a democracy, on the other hand, someone who fails to get elected to office can always console himself with the thought that there was something not quite fair about it. But what had the most evident effect in urging on the dissident party was the strength of Alcibiades’ position in Samos and the fact that they did not believe that the oligarchy would last. Each one of them therefore tried to get in first as leader and champion of the people in general.

p.1215

The Athenians are sorely defeated by a Peloponnesian flotilla at Eretria in Euboea. Due to the internal divisions within Athens, the flotilla could have easily sailed against Athens and conquered it merely by anchoring in its harbor. By this point, Athens was a shadow of its former self, with no funds nor a fleet (excepting that at Samos). Thucydides once again derides Spartan inaction, in contrast to the enterprising nature of the Athenians.

When the news of what had happened in Euboea came to Athens, it caused the very greatest panic that had ever been known there. Not the disaster in Sicily, though it had seemed great enough at the time, nor any other had ever had so terrifying an effect. And indeed there was every reason for despondency: the army at Samos was in revolt; they had no more ships, and no more crews for ships; there was civil disturbance among themselves, and no one could tell when it might not come to actual fighting; and now, on top of everything, this disaster in which they had lost their fleet, and, what was worst of all, Euboea, which had been more useful to them than Attica itself. And what disturbed them most greatly and most nearly was the thought that the enemy, after their victory, might venture to come straight on at them and sail against Piraeus, which was now left with no navy to defend it; indeed, they expected every moment to see them coming. And, if the Peloponnesians had been more daring, they could easily have done this. They would then either have produced, simply by anchoring off the city, still greater dissension inside, or, if they stayed there and undertook siege operations, they would have forced the fleet in Ionia, however hostile it might be to the oligarchy, to come to the help of their own people and of the city itself; and meanwhile the Hellespont and Ionia would have fallen into their hands, together with the islands and everything as far as Euboea – the whole Athenian empire, in fact. However, on this occasion, as on many others, the Spartans proved to be quite the most remarkably helpful enemies that the Athenians could have had. For Athens, particularly as a naval power, was enormously helped by the very great difference in the national characters – her speed as against their slowness, her enterprise as against their lack of initiative. This was shown by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character and fought best against them.

p.1216

The Coup is deposed and replaced with a more democratic government, which exceeds the efficiency of the previous democratic government.

When they got the news, the Athenians, in spite of everything, manned twenty ships. They also summoned immediately the first of a number of assemblies. The assembly met in the Pnyx, where they used to meet before. The Four Hundred were deposed and it was voted that power should be handed over to the Five Thousand, who were to include all who could provide themselves with a hoplite’s equipment, and that no one, on pain of being put under a curse, was to receive any remuneration for the holding of any office. A number of other assemblies were held later, at which legal advisers were chosen and all the other steps taken for drawing up the constitution. Indeed, during the first period of this new regime the Athenians appear to have had a better government than ever before, at least in my time.

APPENDIX 3

The Melian Dialogue

p.1246

The translator asserts that the Melian Dialogue may have been more attributable to the imagination of Thucydides than to actual events.

The dialogue takes the following course. The Athenians refuse to discuss either the justice of their demand or any substantive arguments the Melians may wish to offer. They narrow the discussion to hard realism, to expediency. You are too weak, they tell the Melians, to resist effectively. We, on the other hand, cannot allow you to remain outside the alliance, because that may have a bad effect on our subjects.6 What hope of successful resistance can you have? You cannot count on Spartan assistance. Accept the situation realistically and surrender.

This dialogue thus poses the question of authenticity in a different way from the speeches, and I suggest that, in giving it the formal structure it has, Thucydides was deliberately pointing up the difference.7 The problem is not, as has sometimes been suggested, about Thucydides’ possible informants. That is nearly always an unanswerable question about Thucydides, but it is not difficult to guess several possibilities in this particular instance. The fundamental question is whether such a dialogue is credible at all, under the circumstances. Any answer will necessarily be a subjective one, not subject to decisive proof or disproof. The narrow stress on expediency is equally characteristic of Thucydides’ speeches; but the abstractness of the argument here convinces me that, this time, Thucydides has invented more or less everything except the fact that there were negotiations, which broke down, and that Melos was then captured and the male population killed.

This is not the place for an extended discussion, but one small sign deserves notice. Midway in the dialogue, the Athenians warn the Melians that ‘hope is an expensive commodity’, and conclude this section as follows:

And do not be like those people who, as so commonly happens, miss the chance of saving themselves in a human and practical way, and, when every clear and distinct hope has left them in their adversity, turn to what is blind and vague, to prophecies and oracles and such things which by encouraging hope lead men to ruin (v, 103).

Not only is this Thucydides’ personal view, expressed more than once in the History,8 but it is extremely unlikely that an Athenian delegation would have taken such a line even in a secret negotiation, especially when the Melians had themselves made no reference to prophecies and oracles.

The suggestion, in sum, is that the Melian dialogue represents Thucydides’ own reflections, fairly late in the war (at least later than the Sicilian disaster, to which all the talk about hope and the prophecies that fostered it are an ironic reference), about the moral problems of empire and power.